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ABSTRACT
This study investigated the effect the price of oil has on enabling political establishments
to maintain their presence within the business environment. The study consists of three different
case studies with each of the states (Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates) being
chosen based upon their level of state involvement within the business community. Each case
study investigated whether the price of oil had any effect on influencing the amount of political
involvement within the business community, property rights or trade freedom. The findings for
all three case studies suggest that the price of oil has little to no effect on determining the amount
of influence the state possesses within the business environment. Based on the results of this
investigation, recommendations were made to improve the United States relationship with each
country. Additional analysis and recommendations were made concerning the future economic
impact of Iraq relying solely on oil as its revenue source.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

First Law of Petropolitics

Oil, outside of water and oxygen, has replaced all other resources as the most essential
resource for the survival of the modern state. Without the use of oil, the world would be
deprived of thousands of products that are involved in everyday use; these products include
medicines, plastics, clothes and vehicles 1 . The political importance of oil increases
exponentially as developing and developed nations continue to expand their economies using oil
as the primary energy source. The discovery of oil has proven to be a blessing to states without
other resources to capitalize on economically. In places such as the Middle East where many
natural resources are scarce commodities, oil has provided a way for governments to earn
national revenue. The world has become increasingly reliant upon oil to continue its economic
development. Middle East countries economic policies have also become increasingly reliant
upon the exportation of oil for economic development. This increased reliance upon such an
influential, important and non-renewable resource has caused government policies to become
complacent in their need to grant citizens the freedom to conduct various economic activities2 .

1

Jenkins, Linda. "Don't underestimate the importance of oil and gas." 26 Dec. 1997. 24 Sept. 2008
<http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1997/12/29/editorial3.html>.
2
Vásquez, Ian. "Economic Freedom in the Arab World." Washington Times 22 Dec. 2005. 29 Apr. 2008.
1

Thomas Friedman refers to this theory as the First Law of Petropolitics 3 , the widely assumed
theory oil has a negative influence on economic liberalism.
This study examined oil's influence on the politics of the business environment in Persian
Gulf states. Over ten a year span, 1998-2007, the price of oil changed dramatically. This change
provided fertile ground to examine the negative effect oil has on specific principles of economic
liberalism. The essential points of economic liberalism are free markets and limited political
involvement in the economy 4 . These points have proven to be the backbone for the most
efficient and prolific economies in the world. Liberalizing businesses from political input is a
significant part of that equation. The freeing of businesses from the bonds of government
policies liberalizes business and other actors in market place. The policy of liberalization allows
actors to take risks and development various economic sectors with the greatest return. With the
ever increasing revenue derived from oil, Persian Gulf governments are hesitant to liberalize
economic activity and permit businesses to operate outside of government control.
The natural barometer in determining oil’s influence is the revenue derived from its sale.
The price of oil determines the extent to which government policies are reliant upon the oil
industry for its economic survival. The price of oil is chosen above the overall revenue derived
from oil. This strategic choice demonstrates the importance the price of oil plays in the minds of

3

Friedman, Thomas. "The First Law of Petropolitics." Foreign Policy (May/June 2006): 28-36. 16 May 2008.
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3426>
4
Wynne, Mark A. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, The Legacy of Milton and Rose Friedman’s Free to Choose:
Economic Liberalism at the Turn of the 21st Century, Oct. 2003, Dallas, Texas. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
Oct. 2003. Federal Reserve Bank. 24 Sept. 2008 <http://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/ftc/intro.pdf>.
2

each government's political decision makers. For the government policies to maximize the
yearly oil revenue, they must first maximize the price of each barrel. The price of oil has another
role in governments' decision making processes. The price of oil is used as a floor price for
determining how much oil a particular state is going to produce. The various nations of the
world look at the price of oil as a means for making decisions concerning their own energy
policy. Foreign governments do not make policy decisions based on the total oil revenue
flowing into other government treasuries. Rather governments make domestic policy decisions
based upon the price of oil and that prices impact on their citizens' lives. The price of oil is also
one of the main measures for how the individual actors inside the market make strategic choices.
The political business environment has a tremendous impact on the states' population. A
liberal business political environment allows individual citizens to control business activity and
economic sectors. Conversely, a government that relies on a planned economic approach has the
state as the central figure in the economy. All of the data used for measuring the politics of the
business environment was derived from the Heritage Foundations' Economic Freedom Index.
The data for business freedom is based on a scale of one through one hundred. A score of one
hundred indicates a completely open and liberal business environment, while a score of zero
indicates that the government is the sole of owner and operator of any businesses in that state.
The political business environment dictates domestic and international enterprises’ freedom to
start, operate, and close a business, and measures the amount and efficiency of government

3

regulations 5 (p.4). A thorough examination of the political business environment requires
looking at business freedom, property rights and trade freedom. The business freedom, or
liberalization of the business environment, is influential in directing resources to various sectors
in the economy. This is a highly capricious aspect of the business environment that includes a
variety of different factors including: the time and number of procedures required to start a
business, cost (% of income per capita) required to start a business, the time and number of
procedures required and cost (% of income per capita) to obtain a license, cost (% of estate), time
required to close a business, and the recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 6 (p.4). The second aspect
of the political business environment is property rights. The measurement of property rights is
very similar to measuring business freedoms. A scale of zero through one hundred is used
moving in increments of ten. A score of zero shows property rights are outlawed, as property
rights scores increase more and more property rights are granted. The highest possible score is
one hundred, which indicates property rights are guaranteed. Property rights allow a person the
incentive to create and provide a value added activity to any object. Property rights are
determined by "the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the
degree to which its government enforces those laws" 7 (p.13). In looking at this characteristic of
the political business environment, property rights are very complex and comprise the likelihood

5

Beach, William W., and Tim Kane. Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic liberalisms. Heritage Foundation.
2008. 39-55. <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/Index2008_Chap4.pdf>.
6
Beach., 2008
7
Beach., 2008
4

that property analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the amount of corruption within the
judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The final trait of the
political business environment is trade freedom. Measuring trade freedom differs slightly than
measuring the previous two variables. Trade freedom uses a sliding scale with the lowest
possible score of zero, which indicates tariff and non-tariff barriers at the maximum possible
value. A score of one hundred indicates that the country does not possess any tariff or non-tariff
barriers. Since the advent of the microchip the world has become a shrinking globalized market
place. States and companies alike must be able to compete in a globalized economic community
in order to survive. To accomplish this goal, measuring the trade barriers is essential. The trade
freedom encompasses the trade-weighted average tariff rate and non-tariff barriers 8 (p.5).
For many years, states in the Persian Gulf region have relied almost exclusively on a
mercantilistic economic system, with states using oil revenues to finance domestic activities.
The mercantilistic economic system has allowed each government to maintain control over many
different sectors of the economy. States employing a mercantilistic economic philosophy are
forced to endure either financial “feast or famine.” In maintaining this economic philosophy, the
future economic viability for states in this region is determined by the dynamic the price of oil
has on political decisions governing the economy. Therefore, first hypothesis is: As the price of
oil increases citizens of each state experience a decrease in business freedoms. However, due to

8

Beach., 2008
5

the historical reliance on mercantilism generating national income, vis-a-vis the price of oil, the
state is reluctant to liberalize the business community creating a moderately negative
relationship. The revenue derived from the sale of each separate barrel of oil allows the
government to continually prevent the liberalization of the business environment. The lack of
liberal business policies prevents individual autonomy and keeps the government monopoly over
certain sectors of the economy. Also failure to liberalize the business community keeps the
government's position as a significant factor in citizens’ household incomes. Until the price of
oil decreases, the government will not relinquish any of the political controls over business
freedoms.
Any analysis that involves the political business environment must include the topic of
property rights. The positive or negative movement of the price of oil on property rights is a
crucial factor in examining the totality of oil’s proposed influence on the liberalization of the
business environment. The predisposition of governments in the Persian Gulf region is towards
maintaining their power. An increase in the price of oil emboldens the states’ central authority to
keep their dominance in property rights. Therefore, the second hypothesis is: As the price of oil
increases the number of property rights citizens experience decreases. Property rights provide
the impetus not only for individual citizens to use their own talents and create for their own
benefit. Property rights grant independence outside the authority of the state as well. An
increase in the price of oil enables governments to continually meet their citizens’ economic
needs. In the process of meeting these needs, governments have not surrendered the authority
over any type of resource to ease the citizens’ sense of economic dissatisfaction.
6

With the rise in globalization the ability to trade with other states has allowed
government policies to strategically focus precious resources on activities in which they have a
competitive advantage. The notion of becoming more dependent on the international community
via trade freedom for essential products is a rather disconcerting concept for many leaders in the
Persian Gulf states. The maximization of each barrel of oil across the globe allows these
governments to become less involved in the world trading community. Therefore, the third
hypothesis is: As the price of oil increases trade freedoms will decrease. Even though oil is a
commodity that needs to be sold on the open market in order to produce revenue, the government
is the one that is engaging in selling the commodity. This allows governments to abdicate the
need to allow greater trade freedom to its citizens.
From a theoretical point of view my paper is attempting to expand upon the ‘natural
resource curse’ literature. The natural resource curse theory states that countries with significant
amounts of natural resources may experience slower economic progress, particularly in
liberalizing the economy, than countries with fewer natural resources9 . Much of the natural
resource curse literature has been associated with negative economic growth 10 , the impact on
democracy 11

9

12

and the promotion of conflict 13 , among other consequences. The previous

Auty, Richard M. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies : The Resource Curse Thesis. New York:
Routledge, 1993.
10
Sachs and Warner, 1999 J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, The big push, natural resource booms and growth, Journal
of Development Economics 59 (1999), pp. 43–76.
11
Jensen, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa." Comparative
Political Studies 37 (2004): 816-841. Academic Search Premier.
7

research has studied the results of economic activity or other such variables that move to
promote a more open society, but these studies have not addressed an essential part of an open
society. This study continues to develop the natural resource curse literature by expanding into
the effects natural resources have on the principles of economic liberalism, specifically business
freedom. Even with the movement to promote alternative energy and become energy
independent, oil remains the primary energy source in the foreseeable future 14 . Therefore, the
policy implication of this paper is geared towards the impact of the price of oil on economic
liberalism. This study takes an international focus on oil’s ability, in an extremely volatile
region of the world, to enable governments the continued denial of certain principles of
economic liberalism. The second policy impact of this paper is how oil’s effect on economic
freedom affects America’s future relationship and foreign policy towards specific states within
that region. The ultimate goal of foreign policy is to promote ones’ own philosophies to other
countries in hopes that the other country adopts that policy, or parts of that policy, as their own.
This move is carried out under the pretense of increasing the safety of that particular state in the
international system. A significant part of American foreign policy is moving “countries in the
Muslim world to advance economic reform [liberalism] 15 ”. Another implication of this paper

12

Ross, Michael "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," World Politics 51 (January 1999)
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution 49
(2005). Academic Search Premier.
14
Maugeri, Leonardo Maugeri. "Oil: Never Cry Wolf—Why the Petroleum Age Is Far from over." Energy Bulletin.
20 May 2004. 5 June 2008 <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/347>.
15
Mission Statement. The United States of America. Department of State. Department of State and USAID.
8
13

extends into the contentious arena of Iraq. Currently, Iraq derives a preponderance of its revenue
from the sale of oil. For the principles of economic liberalism the implications of relying on oil
as the predominant means of self-sustainability has the potential to erode any progress made in
changing the state’s economic structure. This is especially important considering that the oil
sharing bill recently made strides to move beyond nationalization and include investment from
private companies 16 . The ultimate goal of this paper, from a policy perspective, is to
demonstrate that oil enables government to continually deny specific economic freedoms to their
citizens.

Previous Works
In 1958 A.J. Meyer raised the question of “attitudinal problems of entrepreneurship” 17 in
the Middle East. Meyer highlighted "management, risk-taking and innovation" as essential for
the Middle East to develop in their economic mindset. This question and assessment strike at the
heart of the economic mindset in the Middle East. In the 50 years since the writings of Meyer,
little has changed for many of these countries. While this article does not place specific blame

Department of State. 24 Sept. 2008 <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>.
16
Wong, Edward. "Iraqis Reach an Accord on Oil Revenues." New York Times. 27 Feb. 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/27/world/middleeast/27iraq.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp.
17
Meyer, A. J. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Development in the Middle East." The Public Opinion Quarterly 22
(1958): 391-396.
9

on oil for inhibiting economic freedom, the foundation has been laid for examining the
relationship between oil and its effect on economic freedom. In the 1970's "The Rentier
Concept" was brought to light by Hossein Mahdavi, who argued that natural resources push
states towards being risk averse and supporting the status quo 18 . This concept has far reaching
implications on states that depend on natural resources. By maintaining the status quo states are
not likely to engage in the economic reforms needed to promote economic freedom. In 1987,
Beblawi and Luciani defined the sale of natural resources as states’ primary source of income,
rather than relying on taxation 19 or other non-natural resource industries. Beblawi and Luciani
reiterate and expand on the views held by Hossein Mahdavi, coming up with four characteristics
that comprise a Rentier state:
1. If rent situations predominate,
2. If the economy relies on substantial external rents,
3. If only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the
generation of the rent
4. That the state’s government is the principle recipient of the external rent 20 .
While still somewhat vague, these four characteristics further provide a concrete set of standards
for defining a "Rentier State." Government entities which possess the aforementioned Rentier
State qualifications are pragmatic, even stagnant, when moving to a system based on economic
liberalism. The lack of movement is in part due to convincing citizens they will have “to pay the

18

Mahdavi, Hossein. 1970. The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: the case of Iran.
In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Michael Cook. London.
19
Beblawi, Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo eds., The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
20
Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., The Arab State, London, Routledge
10

state, not rely on it”. The slow movement away from a reliance on the Rentier Effect
compliments the political establishment's strategic choice of being dependent upon natural
resources. This continued reliance on being a Rentier State has also served the political purpose
of effectively removing any economic issues from state opposition parties as a means of
mobilization 21 . States are attempting to engage in economic reform activities and move away
from being Rentier States, but it is not simply engaging in economic reform that matters. The
stage in the reform process in which government becomes involved also has an effect on the
progress towards implementing a market system 22 . Terry Lynn Karl takes a much broader look
at what influences the economy than merely the Rentier Effect. Karl's central contention is that
the "interaction between decision makers' framework and the leading export sector, not the
properties of the export 23 " are what contributes to the mismanagement of resources. This is
particularly important for Persian Gulf states, because many of the states’ leaders possess
authoritarian backgrounds and view the economy not as a free entity but rather as something that
needs to be controlled by the state.
According to Michael Ross, from a political perspective, the natural resource curse has
extended beyond the economic realm and moved into the general institutions of the state by

21Shambayati, Hootan "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in
Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics 26 (April 1994).
22
Chaudhry, Kiren. "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State." Comparative Politics 27
(1994): 1-25. JSTOR.
23
Karl, Terry Karl L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkley, CA: University of California P,
1997.
11

inhibiting the movement towards democratic institutions and forms of government 24 . This is
especially true concerning economies that are oil based 25 . This prohibition of democracy, as a
result of the natural resource curse, will certainly impact the movement towards economic
freedom. Both economic freedom and democracy are based on the same foundation principles:
rule of law, individual rights, private property and independent courts. According to Fareed
Zakaria these principles should be the primary foreign policy goal of the United States 26 .
In 1999 William Ascher wrote in his book, Why Governments Waste Resources, that the
natural resource curse was not the result of deregulation or greedy politicians. Rather the author
cites poor choice and implementation of strategic policy decisions 27 . With poor policy decisions
governments have created a situation that allows for the natural resource curse to be active in the
market place. Not allowing the consumer to dictate certain economic factors allows the
government to abuse and misallocate natural resources and natural resource revenues 28 . The
poor policy choices by government are the antithesis of Jean-Philippe Stijns point that natural
resources do not prevent any significant structural challenges in terms of economic development.
Rather Stijns argues what matters most is what countries do with their natural resources [that

24

Ross.. 1999
Ross, Michael. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53 (2001).
26
Zakaria, Fareed. "How to Save the Arab World." Newsweek 24 Dec. 2001.
25

http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/122401_how.html.
27

Ascher, William. Why Governments Waste Resources: The Political Economy of Natural Resource Policy Failures
in Developing Countries. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999.
28
Humphreys, Macartan, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. Escaping the Resource Curse. New York:
Columbia UP, 2007.
12

matters] 29 . Regardless of the efficiency of economic sectors many states, especially in
developing countries, believe the energy sector of the economy is “different”. Certain economic
sectors are not as strategically vital to the continuation and security of the state as the energy
sector. However, the energy sector is strategically important and must be directed from a
centrally planned apparatus 30 .
Papyrakis and Gerlagh, empirically look at the effect natural resources have on economic
growth. When examined in isolation natural resources have a negative impact on growth.
However, when combined using "transmission channels," which is the effect natural resources
have on other variables, the impact of natural resources is positive on economic growth 31 . One
of the most important factors of this paper is the variables included in the transmission channels.
These variables include corruption, investment, and terms of trade all of which are included to
some extent in the calculations of economic freedom. To a lesser extent the aforementioned
variables are included in business freedom. Papyrakis and Gerlagh cite the positive influence of
government policies in the application of natural resources. Ragnar Torvik uses a very simple
statistical formula to examine the natural resource curse theory. Torvik arrives at the conclusion
that depending on the amount of return from engaging in rent seeking behavior, will determine

29Stijns, Jean-Philippe C. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited." Department of
Economics. Apr. 2005. Northeastern University. 23 Sept. 2008 <www.economics.neu.edu/papers/documents/05002.pdf>.
30
Robinson, Colin. "Energy Economist and Economic Liberalism." The Energy Journal 21 (2000).
31
Papyrakis , Elissaios and Reyer Gerlagh (2004), The resource curse hypothesis and its transmission channels,
Journal of Comparative Economics 32,181-193.
13

the number of citizens seeking in rent seeking behavior (p.32). This is to be expected
considering individuals will always engage in activity that provides the greatest return. Roland
Hodler expands upon the theory provided by Torvik. This theory states countries which are
ethnically fractionalized have a greater a chance of not utilizing those natural resources.
Conversely, states that are ethnically homogeneous will not suffer from the natural resource
curse. These states can capitalize on those resources (p.33). This theory has direct applications
to states in the Persian Gulf.
In one of the few applicable case studies, to my thesis, Andrew Rosser conducted a test of
the resource curse theory in the worlds' most populated Muslim country; Indonesia. In his case
study Mr. Rosser argues that the rapid economic growth that took place wasn't due to the
hindrances of natural resources. Rather Mr. Rosser makes the argument it was through the
political victory over communist forces and their strategic geographic proximity to Japan that
allowed the country to move past resources. One of the key conclusions that can be drawn from
the Case of Indonesia is the "political victory of social forces that promote and develop capitalist
economic relations is an important prerequisite for overcoming the resource curse. 34 "
One of the most intriguing articles concerning economic freedom and oil was published,

32

Torvik, Ragnar. "Natural Resources, rent seeking and welfare." Journal of Development Economics 67 (2002):
455-70.
33
Hodler, Roland. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries." European Economic Review 50
(2006): 1367-386.
34
Rosser, Andrew. "Escaping the Resource Curse: The Case of Indonesia." Journal of Contemporary Asia 37 (2007):
38-58.
14

in 2006, from the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas by Stephen Brown and Richard Alm. The
Brown-Alm analysis reverses my independent and dependent concepts, but still provides an
excellent cause and effect linkage between the two concepts. The authors look beyond the mere
one-dimensional and self-evident answer for the rise in gasoline as the result of increased
consumption by developing states; primarily China and India. Instead, the authors analyze the
effect market systems have had on oil production35 . Brown and Alm come to the conclusion that
market systems play a significant role in oil production stating “When it comes to increasing oil
production, economic systems matter quite a bit… prices would be lower if major oil resources
were in countries where producers responded freely to market incentives". A superior majority
of the world’s oil reserves are found in countries that, according to the Heritage Foundation, are
lacking economic freedom, and most of these states are located in the Middle East. Brown and
Alm make the point that if these states allow privatization, rather than nationalization, to become
the preeminent player in the oil production industry then stability and simple market principles of
supply and demand would come into play. This paper is important because it demonstrates the
linkages between market principles and oil. This paper also elucidates’ the real world
ramifications of not allowing market principles to have an effect. In addition to switching the
concepts, another point of differentiation between my area of work and the authors is the
different areas of economic liberalism that are affected by oil. Brown and Alm did not focus on

35

Alm, Richard, and Stephen Brown. "Running on Empty? How Economic Freedom Affects Oil Supplies."
Economic Letter—Insights From the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 1 (2006).
<http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2006/el0604.html>.
15

how oil-based economies affect economic freedom of citizens in other areas of life. The authors
strictly adhered to economic freedoms effect on the world oil market. While Brown and Alm
actively call for less participation from government entities and greater participation of the free
market some authors believe that move would be detrimental to a state. Kamil Mahdi believes
oil producing countries can’t merely have a policy of no or limited government influence; rather
government must present and provide a policy of economic intervention in the management of
resources 36 . The research on natural resources and economic freedom is rather narrow instead
many authors prefer to stay with natural resources effect on broad categories. Nicholas Shaxson
performed a study validating the negative association between natural resources and economic
growth 37 . Shaxson examined the negative effect of natural resources and corruption as not the
cause of foreign companies, but rather the mismanagement of government and a lack of trust in
government officials to not use their offices for personal gain.
My work expands the breadth of topics the natural resource curse covers in two ways.
The first means of expansion occurs by looking at a topic that has previously been given no
attention; business freedom. Works thoroughly vetting the effects of the natural resource curse
and economic development has been produced 38 . Research has included the natural resource
curse-business freedom relationship. The literature provides a basis for further examining the

36

Mahdi, Kamil. "Neoliberalism, Conflict and an Oil Economy: The Case Of Iraq." Arab Studies Quarterly 29
(2007): 1-20.
37
Shaxson, Nicholas. "Oil, Corruption and the Resource Curse." International Affairs 83: (2007): 1123-1140.
Academic Search Premier.
38
Auty, Richard. Resource Abundance and Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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effects the natural resource curse has on principals of economic freedom. The second way my
paper contributes to the literature is narrowing the scope of countries covered to specific
individual states in the highly important energy resource area of the Persian Gulf. Most of the
studies that have been conducted concerning natural resources examine sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America or use a cross-section of natural resource dependent states across the globe.
While studies on natural resource use in other parts of the world are important. But the Middle
East, and specifically the Persian Gulf, remains a vital part in the United States foreign policy39 .
Studying these topics provides more in-depth knowledge concerning the powerful influence of
oil on an equally important aspect of foreign policy in a geopolitically crucial area.

The Bear and El Commandante

Two states that meet the requirements of being dependent on natural resources and have
huge amounts of political involvement in the business environment are Russia and Venezuela.
According to the Energy Information Agency, crude natural resources in each of these two states
comprise a significant amount of the global crude reserves; Russia has approximately the fifth
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largest oil reserves in the world, 40 and Venezuela is the single largest oil exporter in the western
hemisphere 41 . Both of these states also have heavy-handed authoritarian political systems,
making them excellent candidates to be included as case studies. Yet, both of these states
possess certain qualities, besides governmental and geographically, that exempts them from
being included as case studies. The first reason concerns the use of natural resources as their
countries economic foundation. Each of the case study candidates are attempting, or have
already implemented policies, to reduce the amount of oil that their state depends on. Russia and
Venezuela have continued to embark on a mercantilist economic path. Instead of opting for
economic dependence from oil, both of these states have chosen different path. Russia and
Venezuela have unified and increased coordination of oil energy policies for greater efficiency 42 .
The alignment of oil policies allows each government to continually capitalize on their natural
resources, without having to develop other economic sectors. Furthermore, it is not only the
mere reliance upon natural resources that prevent these two states from being included as case
studies. The overall antipathy for removing the political dynamic from the business environment
was the key reason for these states not being included. Since President Hugo Chavez has taken
over power, Venezuela has reached its goal of becoming entirely socialistic in nature. The Hugo

40

"Country Analysis Briefs: Russia." Energy Information Agency. May 2008. Department of Energy. 3 Oct. 2008
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia/background.html>.
41
"Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela." Energy Information Agency. Oct. 2007. Department of Energy. 3 Oct. 2008
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/venezuela/background.html>.
42
Barnard, Anne. "Russia and Venezuela Will Coordinate on Energy." New York Times. 23 July 2008.3 Oct. 2008
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23russia.html?fta=y>.
18

Chavez administration as either nationalized economic sectors or become heavily involved in all
aspects of business. When the Cold War ended, Russia began on the painfully process of
alleviating political involvement from the market place. This progress was rewarded in 2002,
with the United States officially recognized Russia as a market economy 43 . However, the
government is still heavily interconnected in the countries’ economy, which dramatically
increases the “political risk” of investing in that country 44 . The two aforementioned reasons
allow the exclusion of Russia and Venezuela from being considered in the case studies.

Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates

The research design that I employ is a three pronged method. The first three chapters
involve case studies of Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The final
chapter is a conclusion. These three particular states were chosen based on their geographic
proximity to one another, similar religious backgrounds, same governmental styles, all of these
states are members of the Oil Producing Exporting Countries (OPEC) organization and all of the
chosen states are comparable in oil production output; for both their region and the world 45 . The
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key difference in all of these countries is their variation on political involvement within business
community. All of the case study states have strikingly different perceptions, aspirations and
realties concerning the appropriate amount of political involvement in the business environment.
The first three sections of each three case studies are separated based on business freedom,
property rights and trade freedom. The first section of each case study is entitled Price of Oil
and Business Freedoms. In this section, I have examined the movement of business freedoms in
relation to the movement of the price of oil. Also in this section, I looked at the effect of any
outside political influences that enhance or hinder the movement of business freedoms. The
second section is entitled Price of Oil and Property Rights. This section is comprised of
examining whether the increase or decrease in property rights is due the influence of the price of
oil. This section also looks at the influence of any outside variables that affect the movement of
property rights. The third section of each case study is entitled Price of Oil and Trade Freedoms.
The third section looks at the influence the price of oil holds over the amount of trade freedom.
This section examines how the factors that comprise trade freedom are influenced by the price of
oil. Also the third section entails additional outside influences that affect the trade freedoms.
The final chapter consists of a conclusion that lays out the results from each case study. This
chapter also presents the future implications for American foreign policy towards Iraq.

<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm>.
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CHAPER 2: SAUDI ARABIA

Brief History

Prior to the discovery of oil, the Saudi Arabian Kingdom was a tattered array of destitute
communities. The original ruler of these communities was King Abdel Aziz bin Abdel Rahman
al-Faisal al-Saud (also known as Ibn Saud) kept together through British financing and taxes on
the hajj (a traditional Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca) 46 . In 1933, during the midst of declining
revenue from the hajj, the Saudi king arrived at an agreement with Standard Oil of California to
explore the Saudi desert for petroleum. This agreement provided the Saudi King with the much
needed revenue to keep his kingdom together. The oil exploration agreement also served as the
beginning of the kings’ reliance on oil. During the Second World War, Saudi Arabia reduced
their oil production and played a rather minor role. However, after World War II the Kingdom
became a significant participant in world oil production, and was a major supplier of the effort to
rebuild Europe. During the 1950’s and the first part of the 1960’s oil production in Saudi Arabia
thrived, helping to solidify an alliance with the United States and other Western governments.
This relationship was able to prosper not only because of oil, but because of the Saudi’s stringent
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anti-communist stance and their support of anti-communist movements in the region. In 1960,
Saudi Arabia was a founding member in the creation of the Oil Producing Exporting Countries
organization, which allowed “the co-ordination and unification of the petroleum policies of
Member Countries” 47 . By setting the level of each states oil production this policy coordination
created a significant increase in oil revenue for the Kingdom. In the 1970’s OPEC members,
particularly Saudi Arabia continued to experience significant revenue as the result of the
exportation of oil. The 1980’s proved to be less prosperous for oil-based economies, with the
price of oil falling to below $15. The following decade, because of the Persian Gulf War and
Iraqi sanctions, oil prices remained relatively low; prices bottomed out in 1998. With the price
of oil at historically low levels, governments began to fully understand the importance of
economic diversification.
Discussion of moving away from a mercantilist economic system to one based off of
liberal economic policies had been taking place in the Kingdom. In the 1970s, during extreme
oil profits the Saudi government came out with the “first plan.” Among one of the seven major
points of emphasis was directed towards moving the states’ economic base away from the
dependence on crude oil 48 . The priority of continuing private sector development occurred
throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s when oil prices dropped significantly. Each of the next four
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years produced a plan with at least one of the goals to let the private sector grow. However, the
implementation of each plan for private sector development never really fully comes to fruition.
In addition to the economic plans, Saudi Arabia had also taken other economically liberal
measures to ensure government limitation in business; privatization and economic diversification
are instituted. During the latter half of 1990’s King Abdullah established the Supreme Economic
Council (SEC). The SEC targeted improving the national economy by subjecting it to market
forces 49 . In 2005, Saudi Arabia continued on their path to liberalization by officially joining the
World Trade Organization (WTO). After more than 12 years of negotiations, Saudi Arabia and
the WTO were finally able to arrive at an accession agreement. In the accession agreement, the
bench marks for privation were “remarkably ambitious” with aviation, postal services,
telecommunications, education, and many other publicly owned companies/industries all slated
to become privatized 50 . By joining the WTO, Saudi Arabia is moving beyond mere self imposed
liberal reforms. The World Trade Organization has rules and penalties that are enforceable, by
fellow members, as compared to an internal agreement that is self-enforced. Saudi Arabia has
made prior commitments in moving towards an open and liberal economic system, but the state
has been excruciatingly slow to implement such initiatives. With so many attempts at embracing
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free market principles, the next section will examine the fundamental point of this paper; is oil
the reason behind the lack of liberal economic reform?

Price of Oil and the Politics of Business Freedoms

Over the period of time being examined, 1998-2007, the Saudi government was not able
to increase the liberal economic policy objectives of enabling businesses to operate without
government interference. The government has not always been so stringent in business
regulations. In 1998, Saudi Arabia was at its zenith in promoting a business atmosphere that was
able to operate in a liberal free market. These actions resulted in Saudi Arabia accumulating a
business freedom score of just below 90. This score placed the kingdom on the same level as the
developed countries of the world such as Japan, France, Canada, the United States and the
United Kingdom. However, even with entry into the WTO, creation of the SEC and continually
producing economic development plans, in the course of ten years Saudi Arabia has erased any
progress towards liberal goals by reverting back to a state centered business system. The erosion
of business’ ability to function outside of the state has placed Saudi Arabia on the same level as
the developing states of Gabon, Guatemala, Laos and Chad. During this same time period the
price of oil has increased exponentially; moving from a price of just above $10 to just below $70
per barrel (See business environment graph). With oil’s remarkable price increase the Saudi
government was experiencing windfall profits. The combination of an increasingly hostile
24

attitude towards liberal policies and increasing oil revenues enabled the Saudi government from
little more than lip service towards reducing their presence in the business community. The
Saudi government possesses some liberal economic tendencies by releasing nationalized
industries to function with the state being involved. This includes not only releasing businesses
from government control but also removing restrictions on industries and letting a greater
amount of businesses into those industries. Part of the move to reduce the regulations
governments institute on businesses is increasing the level the free market is allowed to play in
the selection of whom succeeds and whom does not. To accomplish this goal, the Saudi
government has spoken of reducing their role in economic interactions and allowing the private
sector to become the primary instrument which drives the economy. Another part of the Saudi
governments plan in reducing their economies mercantilistic nature involves instituting
economic plans.
In addressing this mercantilistic predisposition the Kingdom has produced economic
development plans every five years. These development plans will not only help overall the
efficiency of the economy, but promote the culture of reducing barriers, which will allow
businesses to operate with a greater sense of freedom from government. The seventh
development, 2000-2004, plan talked extensively about the need to privatize the Saudi Arabian
economy as a means of diversifying away from non-renewable resources. However, steps and
deadlines for actually implementing privatization methods were left unfulfilled, leaving the
Saudi economy no further towards privatization then the previous development plan. The eighth
economic development plan, 2005-2009, has very similar predispositions towards becoming
25

more liberal, and similarly does not mention steps or deadlines to accomplish these goals.
Creating actual plans for economic liberalization is progress but not laying out when the
economic liberalization will take place negates any progress made. With the continual
inadequate influence of these economic development plans, the Saudi government created the
Supreme Economic Council as another similar measure to ensure the increasing ability of
business to function in a liberal economic environment. The Supreme Economic Council has
published a list of industries to be privatized, but the Council leaves the timeline and method for
introduction to the private sector to be determined at a later date 51 . While the lack of a timeline
in either development plans or in the SEC plans does not force ill-advised and rushed moves to
economic liberalism. The lack of timeline for liberalization creates a sense of the government
being disingenuous. The lack of a liberalization timeline also prohibits any clear sense of growth
in the private sector away from the extreme influence exerted by government.
In addition to the internal attempts at liberalization, Saudi Arabia has made external
attempts to become a more economically open society. A prerequisite for joining these
organizations is liberalization of business practices. This involves diminishing the states
influence over the entire market place, and business ability to function in that market place.
According to the Doing Business Report 52 , the Saudi Arabia government has made strides

"List of Utilities." Supreme Economic Coucil. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 2 Oct. 2008
<http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/47215a65-b78d-4598-8d7a-2e597e5c1815/list_of_utilities.aspx>.
52
Doing Business is a report published by the World Trade Organization that assesses the ability to operate a
business within a given country.
26
51

towards reducing specific aspects of involvement in the business environment by continually
lowering the number of days required to open a business (see Open-SA graph). Conversely, the
Saudi Arabian government has made little progress in reducing the number of procedures to open
a business (See Procedures Graph-Saudi Arabia) and the time required to close a business (see
Closing-SA Graph) among an additional lack of reforms in other variables. Even though the
Doing Business Report has only been published over the last several years, the findings from the
report are emblematic of the slow and inconsistent. Part of entering into a free market system is
allowing resources to shift from industry to industry without the interference of government.
Over the last several years the Saudi government has been more than willing to reduce the time
to open a business, but the time required to close a business has remained stagnant. Merely
looking at the unit of analysis reveals that the government is more than willing to grant
businesses the right to open, which is measured in days. But the government is declined to allow
businesses to close, measuring the variable in years. The prevention of business closures is due
to the high unemployment rates that the country is facing; not the price of oil. This ever growing
social constraint has inhibited the proper liberal economic reforms, because the government
restrictions in the aforementioned time required for businesses closures. For the government the
social cost of unemployment is greater than the economic cost of market inefficiencies. The
dichotomy of this relationship represents the constraints the Saudi government faces; striking a
balance between modernization and the integrity of traditional values of the cultural and society.
The majority of reasons behind the political involvement in the business world stem from
concerns that lie outside of the influence of a price of oil. The price of oil is not completely
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abdicated from negatively influencing the liberalization of the business environment. One way
this variable plays a role in injecting politics into the business sphere is through the use of
subsidies. Subsidies still play a large role in the Saudi economy, helping the government to
artificially sustain failing economic sectors and support citizens. Over the last 10 years the
production of oil has remained relatively steady, at about 3.4 billion barrels per year 53 , but the
price of oil has increased every year. The dramatic increase in the price of oil provides excess
capital resources to continue funding subsidies. The government has interjected itself into the
business environment by providing artificial income to citizens; therefore the need to decrease
government intrusion in the business sector takes place at a slower rate. Subsidies contribute to
the antithesis of removing the politics from business liberalization, which is self-reliance. With
citizens becoming reliant upon government for their income, the motivation to engage in risk
(opening business, expanding production lines/ facilities) for providing self derived income, or
increased income, is diminished. This in-turn expands governments’ involvement within the
business sector. The population, with all of their needs being met by the government does not
need to have an atmosphere conducive for citizens to engage in risk/reward business behavior.
This allows government to remain firmly entrenched in the business environment.
Overall, the price of oil only has a partial influence on actually prohibiting business
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freedoms. During the time period being examined the price of oil has significantly increased but
so has the attempts to remove government from influencing the domestic market. Yet, the
government's attempts at instituting market liberalization have not resulted in a decrease of their
influence. Oil is ingrained into the economic foundation of Saudi Arabia, and finance subsides
that allow the government to remain overly activity in the business community, this is not the
sole culprit for government intervention. The reasons for government involvement in economic
activities move past the ebb-and-flow of the price of oil and extend into the social and religious
structures. The government actually instituting market reforms will only move as fast as the
political leaders wish.
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Table 1 Business Freedom's in Saudi Arabia
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Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. 2006.
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Table 2 Time required to open a business (days) in Saudi Arabia
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Table 3 Number of Procedures to Open a Business in Saudi Arabia
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Table 4 Time required to close a business (years) in Saudi Arabia
Number of Years
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Property Rights

Out of all the principles of economic liberalism the most important is the creation of
property rights. Property rights comprise the foundation of an open liberal economic and
political system. Upon accession into the WTO and the creation of bilateral trade agreements,
Saudi Arabia’s status as a state that lacks sufficient property rights had not changed. However,
in recent years the Saudi legal system has made strides to enact many laws protecting intellectual
property rights and property rights in general. Copy write enforcement laws have been updated
to correspond with entry into the WTO. Nonetheless, even with the strides at reform, the
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Kingdom continually remains on the United States “Watch 301 list” 58 and “enforcement still lags
behind and the procedures [on property rights laws] are inconsistent 59 ”. All of these reforms
have been made under the premonition of expanding and diversifying the economy away from
oil, while the price of oil has steadily increased.
In 1998, much like business freedoms, Saudi Arabia possessed one of the highest
property rights rankings in the globe. However, in a span of 2 years, Saudi Arabia saw that
ranking fall to anemic levels, where it has remained. During that same period of time the price
of oil continually increased (see Property Rights Graph-Saudi Arabia). The revenue generated
by an increase in the price per barrel has provided the Saudi government ample opportunity to
engage in reforming property rights to reach part of their consistently self-lauded goal of
economic diversification. However, the Saudi government has opted to remain entrenched in
their position of restricting property rights. As has previously been chronicled, the Saudi
government has made external trade reform changes by joining trade organizations and entering
into free trade agreements. Nonetheless, the internal reforms of enforcing property laws have yet
to take place. The restrictions governing private property have been reduced and are of
increasingly less concern to the government. The Saudi government has come to have paternal
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instinct governing assets, the economy and its interactions. The government relishes that control
and is very hesitant to relinquish any part of that control. Oil has contributed to this controlling
instinct, through funding any business initiatives that otherwise might have required providing
sufficient free market incentives (property rights) to accomplish.
Like all other issues the lack of property rights does not begin and end with government
intervention, the religious dynamic of the Saudi population also has a significant impact. The
Sunni Islamic teachings, which Saudi Arabia subscribes, believes in ownership, but not absolute
ownership as conceptualized in Western civilizations. This also includes public land ownership
that is in its natural God-given state, as well as the resources that are under the ground. This
naturally predisposes the government to restrict property rights, but that does not mean that the
government always adheres to this principle. The Saudi government has not expropriated
property from foreigners, particularly Americans 60 and continually removed items from the
negative list; almost all of the items on the banned list are placed on this list because of religious
or geopolitical concerns. The reason for the continually poor ranking in property rights concerns
a lack of enforcement. The question concerning Saudi Arabia is not whether the government
will attempt to make cosmetic changes to policy through speeches or new laws, but rather
through actual enforcement of laws. The Doing Business Report mirrors the results of the
Heritage Foundation concerning property rights in Saudi Arabia over the last several years. The
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Doing Business Report finds that the time and number of procedures to register property has
remained torpid.
The property right dynamic within Saudi Arabia is one that in all probability will
continue to remain for a considerable time. The effect the price of oil has on property rights is
only partially responsible. As the graph indicates, property rights only decreased during several
of the years being examined. The rest of the time period being examined had property rights
remaining stagnant, while the price of oil continually increased. The price of oil does enable the
state to restrict property rights, but the price of oil plays a secondary role to the political and
religious institutions previously entrenched in the state. These institutions hold a considerable
amount of influence over government policy decision, pushing the price of oil to a secondary
role.
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Table 5 Property Rights in Saudi Arabia
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Trade Freedoms

In 1998, the average price of oil was at its lowest point since the 1980’s. During that year
Saudi Arabia only was able to bring in $12.28 for a barrel (see trade freedom graph). The lowest
price of oil also coincided with the worst trade freedom ranking. This year represented the
beginning of a three year period of extremely poor trade freedom rankings. However, with the
conclusion of 2001, Saudi Arabia began to climb out of its anemic performance in limiting the
governments’ involvement in the trade sector. During that same period of time, the price of oil
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moved up $9. By the end of 2007, Saudi Arabia had progressed into the top 100 in trading
freedom, and reduced the difference between the regional leader in trade freedom and
themselves. However, during that period of time the price of oil increased from 12.28 a barrel to
69.07 a barrel. Oil is a vastly important current source of revenue, but the future indicates that
states will be forced to move into other economic areas of progress in order to maintain
economic development. To accurately assess measures of the level of trade freedom, the
variables that must be looked at go beyond simple export and import data. Export and import
data, measure the extent towards economic interaction not the barriers states erect. The volatility
of prices, particularly oil, and provides a false sense of economic openness in a state. This
means purely examining the amount of exports and imports data assess the symptoms of a state,
but does not look at the underlying causes of an economic illness. The total value of exports
throughout this time period has dramatically increased, but the actual weight of exports has only
had a minimal increase 62 . Much of the increase in value is due to the value of oil increasing, not
the state engaging in more trade. The state is experiencing revenues similar to that of the 1970’s.
With all of this disposable capital, citizens are using that capital to import finished goods, rather
than purchasing either semi-finished or raw goods to perform additional value added activities to
goods. The reasoning behind this phenomenon has to do with price of a barrel of oil. The
twenty-first century has seen the price of a barrel of oil significantly rise
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Saudi Arabia has recognized the need to become integrated with the world economic
community, and to do these states must be involved removing barriers and liberalizing their
trading system” 63 . In the span of 10 years, Saudi Arabia has reduced regional trade barriers with
fellow members of the Persian Gulf by creating the Gulf Cooperation Council; a regional
customs union. Saudi Arabia has also entered into a variety of Free Trade Agreements (FTA)
with Egypt (1999), the European Union (2003), WTO (2005) and Japan (2006); also in 2005
Saudi Arabia entered into the Trade and Investment Framework Action (TIFA) with the United
States. Trade Agreements have been the focal point of trade reform in the Kingdom, with a
majority of the effort devoted towards becoming a member in the WTO. For most of the time
period being examined, entering into bilateral trade agreements and the reduction in trade
barriers were built upon the expectation of entering the WTO. The primary motivation, other
than economic expansion, for becoming involved with international trade organizations and
creating regional trading blocs is to become more economically diversified away from domestic
markets and to capitalize internationally on competitive advantages; in Saudi Arabia’s case the
competitive advantage revolves around the non-renewable resource of petroleum. Membership
to these organizations hinges upon reducing trade barriers and enforcing specific agreements,
which is the only way to improve the trade freedom in a country. Post WTO entry, Saudi Arabia
has focused on economic diversification and expansion while restricting government input and
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moving limiting government involvement within property rights to a secondary role. This
philosophy has mirrored their trade freedom ranking. Prior to the enactment of the trade
agreements, the trade freedom ranking had experienced sporadic movement within a small range
[61-64]. However, in the years since instituting these agreements trade freedom has consistently
possessed a moderately free ranking in the low 70’s. This rating was the result of the reduction
of trade barriers as a prerequisite to entering the WTO. After entry into the WTO the efforts to
continue reducing trade barriers ceased, as evidence by the trade freedom ranking for 2006 and
2007, and the price of a barrel of oil continue to rise. The price of a barrel did not inhibit further
trade reforms from being made due to the trade negations that were taking in the first part of the
21st century while the price of a barrel of oil continued to drastically climb. Talks to join the
WTO have been ongoing since shortly after GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
changed to the World Trade Organization.
An extremely important issue such as Intellectual Property Right (IPR) enforcement still
remains at the center of concerns over Saudi Arabia’s ability and willingness to become further
integrated in world trade. The enforcement of such important issues moves to the heart of many
governments in the world community concerns regarding Saudi Arabia, which is enforcement of
laws. The enforcement of laws causes greater variation in the trade freedom ranking than oil.
64
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file complaints and potentially retaliate against such practices. Besides the pursuit of entering
into the World Trade Organization, Saudi Arabia has created the Supreme Economic Council.
The SEC, since its inception, has taken strides toward the deregulation of industries and the
privatization of previously nationalized industries. The SEC has taken steps towards foreign
investment reform, development plans, and other trade reforms. These agreements and
institutions have strengthened the kingdoms position towards greater involvement with the
global community.
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia has increasingly tried to become a part of the world
globalized trading community. The Kingdom has entered into free trade agreements and become
part of customs union. Nonetheless, these improvements in the eliminations of tariffs and
becoming a part of a customs union, TIFA and FTA’s, with the most important trading states and
institutions in the world have still produced only barely hospitable results. The Supreme
Economic Council still generates a “negative list” and bans all Israeli and non-Islamic products.
The SEC has also taken other measures that inhibit states and companies from engaging in
commerce, such as “imposing fees on profession changes in foreign labor” 65 . The institution of
a common external tariff as part of the GCC has provided some semblance to the reduction of
trade barriers. But many of the trade barriers still remain obstacles for products and companies
entering this market. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) still identified a copious
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amount of products that are subject to higher tariff rates up to 100 percent 66 . The reduction of
trade barriers and non-trade barriers is not predicated on the price of a barrel of oil. Therefore,
there is no relationship between the price of oil per barrel and trade freedom. Trade freedom
reforms are not being made for the sake of economic diversification away from oil-related
products. The reforms are being made by government officials to stay competitive in the global
market place. Over the last 10 years the price of oil has continually increased without any
interruptions. However, the trade freedom ranking has experienced erratic movement unrelated
to that of oil. The inception of Saudi Arabia into the WTO was the reason behind an increase in
trade freedom. Prior to the inception to the WTO, the only effective way as a means of
increasing trade liberalism is through outside influence. Even with the inception into trade
organizations the actual implementation of reducing trade barriers is still a problem that has
affected the kingdom.
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Table 6 Trade Freedom in Saudi Arabia
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Policy Implications

The results of this case study indicate that little change will occur in the liberalization of
businesses and trade, and no change will occur in property rights regardless of how much or how
little oil is purchased from Saudi Arabia. In terms of the movement towards US energy
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independence, Saudi Arabia will not become friendlier to the policies of business liberalization,
much less economic liberalization, by removing the US as a final destination for a majority of
Saudi oil. The globalization of the market place and the need for oil will allow oil exporting
countries, especially Saudi Arabia, to always find a market for their product. In economic terms,
Saudi Arabia has remained a strong trading partner of the United States with a majority of the
trade involving oil. Even with this strong economic relationship, trade issues pale in comparison
to other more important issues such as global terrorism, regional security and the Arab-Israeli
conflict. While these are the more pressing issues and take center stage in the minds of the
Secretary of State and her closest advisors, this study still has the potential to impact our policy
towards Saudi Arabia in a meaningful manor. Much like the issues of global terrorism, regional
security and the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil is an issue that is still governed by political
considerations; rather than economic. The Saudi government is attempting to change the
political culture of their country by creating autonomous bodies, the SEC, in charge of the
privatization efforts. These privatization efforts are also political in nature and focus on inward
discussions among experts. This presents the United States an opportunity to provide freemarket based leadership that will help navigate and steer Saudi Arabia towards liberal economic
principles. The liberal free market based leadership will also help Saudi Arabia deal with the
eventual economic woes that come with moving towards this type of system. Rather than create
another bureaucratic body, which runs counter to the premise of economic liberalization, the US
should use an already existing system. One of the best venues for the United States to pursue
political dialogue for an increase in economically liberal policies is in the US-Saudi Strategic
43

Dialogue.
The US-Saudi Strategic Dialogue (USSD) aims to "institutionalize relationships across
government departments in both countries to ensure that issues are dealt with effectively…and
educate each other about certain aspects of our respective societies and systems. 68 " This type of
forum provides the countries' political establishments an opportunity to meet and discuss issues
that are of interest to both parties. The USSD provides the type of atmosphere that would allow
the discussion at all levels of government on the liberalization of businesses, property rights and
trade and how these rights would positively influence the Saudi concerns of high unemployment,
a major concern for all Arab countries 69 , enhancement of economic diversification and further
intertwining the interests of Saudi Arabia and America. Because of the nature of this agreement
and the importance of security issues in the region business freedom issues should be left to
minimum and allow other international organizations to apply pressure for reform aspects of
economic liberalism. The WTO is another arena that allows for conversations concerning the
enhancement of business liberalization. For many years Saudi Arabia had to make concession
concerning the reduction of trade barriers and enhancement of other free market principles in
order to enter the WTO. Since becoming a WTO member Saudi Arabia's trade liberalization
reforms have remained stagnant. Perhaps the most influential organization that could institute
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these reforms is the Supreme Economic Council. Even though this council has not fully lived up
to their agent of reform billing the opportunity still exists for this council to embrace their
mission move beyond the current mercantilistic style economic system. The council is
comprised of the Governor the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Ministers of labor, trade,
petroleum, finance, state and deputy prime minster. But perhaps the most important member of
this council is King Saud. All of these essential executive leaders of the country and economy
have the potential to directly change the economic course of their country. For economic
liberalization to take place the Supreme Economic Council is the organization that the WTO
needs to be actively and persistently persuading to make the liberal reforms. The United States
should use this organization as a political instrument for continually forcing the Kingdom to
develop and support liberal free market principles. Even though this organization does primarily
deal with economic issues Saudi Arabia actively spent years cultivating all types of relationships
to join this organization and continuing to remain in this organization is part of their long term
economic plans.
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CHAPTER 3: IRAN

Brief history

The history of the Iranian oil industry is one of the longest and most prestigious in the
world. This history extends back to the very beginning of the 20th century, with a grant given to
a British citizen, William D’Arcy, granting him the right to explore and transport oil in almost all
of the Iranian territory. Shortly after the discovery of oil in 1908, William D’Arcy sold his
contract to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later renamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company),
which sold a majority of the shares in its company to the British government. This sale triggered
a tension riddled history of interaction and dispute between Iran and the British government over
energy. This history even extends to a modern day conflict between the two countries over
Iranian possession of nuclear technology for domestic "energy" purposes. In the years preceding
the Second World War, the Iranian government had several claims that the oil under their soil
was being exploited by foreigners. The exploitation of Iranian oil was occurring at the expense
of the Iranian people, who were missing out on profits 70 . Several years after the conclusion of
the Second World War, a new, tumultuous period of time in Iranian history started. Iran
nationalized their oil industry in 1949, effectively removing all foreign ownership of oil
companies. The nationalization was also accompanied by the transformation of the Anglo-
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Iranian Oil Company into the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). In 1953 the United States,
in combination with the Shah and General Fazlollah Zahedi, staged a coup d'état of Prime
Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. This coup effectively installed the Shah as Iran's leader. After
the installation of the Shah, a new oil agreement was reached with the NIOC and other foreign
oil companies in an attempt to bolster ties with the United States and Britain. In 1960, Iran along
with several other states formed the oil cartel known as OPEC. During the remaining years of
the Shah’s power, OPEC and Iran faced several problems. These problems included the two oil
crises of the early and late seventies. Both of these crises strained their relationship with western
governments; however these crises paled in comparison to the severing of political ties with the
United States because of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and ensuing American hostage crisis.
Since that time period, Iran renationalized their oil industry, and America barred many domestic
companies from doing business with Iran; effectively severing direct American ties to Iranian oil
fields. With the renationalization of the oil industry, foreign owned companies were prohibited
from owning oil exploring or extraction companies. However, foreign owned companies were
still actively participating in “projects involving the construction of oil field units, refinery
equipment, tanks and pipelines, as well as engineering 71 ”. Like many of the other governments
in the Caspian Sea Area, the Iranian government is dependent upon the sale of oil to finance
many domestic projects, subsidize citizen’s income and expand various sectors of influence.
One of the justifications for the Iranian government in the implementation of a nuclear program
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is an attempt to move away from their dependence on oil and diversify their energy sector.
Currently, regardless of their intentions involving nuclear power, the Iranian economy is still
tremendously reliant upon on the oil industry.
Even with the extreme importance that the oil industry plays in the Iranian economy, the
leaders of Iran have come to realize that a reliance on a commodity, which is heavily exposed to
wild fluctuations, is not a stable economic policy. With this knowledge the Iranian government
is attempting to reduce their political influence within the business environment. The Iranian
history of inhibiting freedoms in many areas of life has been well documented. Even with this
documented history, a link has never been established connecting the price of oil as influencing
the amount of political involvement within the business environment.

Price of Oil and the Politics of Business Freedoms

The early years of the Iranian revolution revealed no real economic plan existed to deal
with the post-revolution economy. While the rest of the world was moving towards
globalization, the only threads of an Iranian economic plan were moving in the opposite
direction 72 . The newly founded Iranian government adopted an Islamic utopian idea for an
economy. This utopian idea of an economy included significant and extensive government
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policies in the business culture and providing the rudimentary necessities for all citizens 73 . The
importance placed on state policies in economic activities were an attempt to move completely
past the economic linkages and international economic dependency created by the shah.
However, this economic utopian quickly turned into a financial wasteland that could not be
continued. Combined with the monetarily costly Iran-Iraq war and the drop in oil prices, this
economic philosophy did not prove to be fortuitous for the Iranian economy. During the late
1980’s and 1990 Iran recognized a change in economic philosophy was needed. This change
began with the election of consecutive conservative presidents; Akbar Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatami. Each of these presidents attempted to embrace liberal free market
principles and removing government policies from the business sector. Along with a change in
leadership, a change in economic philosophy began, which involved producing an economic
plan. The first two economic plans made broad encompassing statements about the movement
towards reducing government policies in business. But both plans failed because each was
unsuccessfully implemented. Even with the implementation of the economic plans, rent-seeking
behavior, the failure to eliminate subsidies and promote private enterprises still occurred.
The third economic plan presented a new set of much more concrete objectives
minimizing the states’ policies in the business world. These objectives included "downsizing of
the government’s role in economic activities, privatization of government enterprises" and the
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"dismantling of monopolies and promoting of competition" 74 . The proposed reductions in the
lowering of barriers to entry also reduced political involvement concerning, which business were
allowed to succeed and which business were not. The removal of government policies from the
business sector is the essential element for the third economic plans to succeed. These changes
were made because of the perceived negative effect of government bureaucracy, but more
specifically these changes were made to diversify the economy away from a reliance on oil.
For most of the time period being examined, 1998 to 2005, the relationship between the
price of oil and business freedoms appeared to non-existent. From 1998-2005, the price of oil
continually increased, but the autonomy of businesses to act without government interference
remained stagnant; neither increasing nor decreasing. During the final two years of this analysis,
2006-2007, the amount for each barrel of oil continued to dramatically increase. However, in
that same period of time amount of political regulations and rules governing businesses
decreased (see business freedom graph-Iran). According to Doing Business, in 2005-2007, some
reductions in the amount of political involvement in the business community took place. There
was a slight reduction in the number of procedures (see number of procedures graph) and days to
complete those procedures for starting a business (see time required graph). But the time
required to close a business still remained extraordinarily high measuring 4.5 years. The
increase in the governments’ reduction of economic policies coincides with the result of the
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election of a new president; Mahmud Ahmadinejad. The reduction in government policies did
not occur as the result of the price movement in oil. The possibility of oil influencing business
freedoms does exist, but that influence is minimized by other international political variables and
individual economic discretions.
A reason for the lack of progressively liberal business freedom policies encompasses the
balancing of political constituencies. During President Khomeni’s administration, several
different constituencies, responsible for his election, were at opposing ends of the economic
spectrum 75 . The balancing of interest group priorities prevented President Khomeni from
instituting the necessary changes need to liberalize the economic system. In the administration
of President Khomeini, the continued high price of oil Iran was experiencing provided the
necessary economic cushion to endure the eventual pains that come along with transforming
economic models. By the government experiencing high oil prices, there was no imperative to
implement any of the economic plans at liberal reforms. The question of the economic impact of
oil on the overall economy, by any measure, is unquestionable. But the influence derived from
oil revenues, in preventing the reduction of government policies to promote business freedoms is
minimal. The price of oil is an underlying factor that allows the government to remain obstinate,
and not move towards reducing political barriers. Nonetheless, the price of oil remains
secondary to the entrenched political institutions. These political institutions control significant
portions of industries and contribute to continually getting officials elected. A much more
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plausible reason to explain the lack of movement in business freedoms has to do with the
political culture in Iranian politics. One aspect of the political culture has to deal with the
redistribution of revenue generated by the price of oil.
The Majlis, during the extreme rise in oil profits have used the extra profit to help
subsidize and promote the private sector. The Majlis and infant companies and industries,
primarily non-oil related segments, argue the need for these subsidized funds to help establish
themselves on the world stage, and mitigate the initial years of not making a profit. In actuality,
the redistribution of extra profit has provided the private sector with a subsidy like income. The
removal or reduction of this subsidy is a political liability. Recently the Iranian government
removed gas subsidies and gasoline decreased gas rations which caused riots. The redistribution
of oil revenues to expand non-oil sectors has harmed the oil sector. The oil sector is the one
sector of the Iranian economy that makes a profit. By moving funds and artificially supporting
non-oil sectors, Iran has effectively deprived the oil sector the funds to refit and upgrade its
aging oil infrastructure 76 (Luft). Previous attempts at state run economic liberalism have failed,
because the government reward companies that have were inefficient, inward looking and
possessed certain sociopolitical characteristics. The subsidies provided into either business
sectors or the general public, are common and used as a means of ensuring favor among the
general population. However, these subsidies inhibit the necessary entrepreneurial spirit from
developing. The economic reform plan that was supposed to be instituted, allowing free-market
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principles to become more prominent, "has proved extremely slow and contentious because of a
lack of domestic political consensus and rigid bureaucratic obstacles to economic reforms 77 "
(siddiqi, 2001). The lack of a political consensus and an inhospitable bureaucratic environment
has enabled the government to maintain policies preventing business reforms, more than the
price of oil. The problem concerning economic liberalization and subsidies highlights the
antithesis of the actual problem of the Iranian economy; government involvement. With
government keeping the current mercantlistic economy intact, the only way to continue to
finance the non-oil sector is by maximizing the profit of each barrel of oil.
For a majority of the years being examined, the price of oil increased but the
governments' efforts to reduce policies governing business did not decrease. In the final years
being examined the policies governing business were finally reduced, while the price of oil
continued upward. Even with the apparent relationship towards the end of the years being
examined, other political factors minimize the potential for a relationship. In conclusion, oil
revenues are responsible for enabling subsidies, which prohibit the citizens need for economic
liberalism. But the use of subsidies is derived from political opportunism. The political
structures and politicians are responsible for inhibiting the expansion of business liberalism.
This makes the movement to economic liberalism a political issue rather than an issue based on
oil. The balancing of various constituencies plays a more prominent in remaining a mercantlistic
economy rather that the stated reason of wanting to diversify the economy away from oil. An
example of prohibiting liberal business reforms involves the ministry that created the economic
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plans; the Ministry of Management and Planning (MPO). The three economic plans that were
created were done so by the somewhat independent Management and Planning Organization; the
President of Iran appointed its leader. The MPO was designed to provide some semblance of a
checks and balances on the president's economic policy, but President Admadinejad abolished
the office and instituted a new budget body that “gives him a freer hand to implement populist
policies 78 ” (gulfnews, 2008). Changing the architect of the economic plans subverts the process
of moving the state towards economic liberalism by interjecting political interest. So, instead
moving to policies of economic liberalism, government policies will remain locked in
mercantilism.
Table 7 Business Freedom in Iran
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Table 8 Number of procedures to open a business in Iran
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Property Rights

The relationship between the price of oil and private property rights does partially exist.
Even though, as the price of oil increases private property rights remain completely stationary
(see Property Rights Graph). Judging from the complete dearth of movement, property rights
appear totally uninfluenced and totally unrelated to the price of oil. When looking at the near
non-existence of property rights even the slightest increase, from 1999-2003, or a more drastic
increase, 2004-2007, in the price of oil would be irrelevant to negatively influencing property
rights. Also the complete lack of movement in property rights is due to the already low ranking
the variable possesses. With an anemic ranking of ten, property rights were at a low enough
level that the price of oil would not have had any effect. The other reason for the lack of
movement in property rights originates from the political structures and the forces that govern
those structures.
From a geographic and topography point of view, the reason for the lack of property
rights for citizens does not stem from the overwhelming land required by the oil industry. Iran
registers slightly more than 1.6 million square kilometers, with the oil fields predominantly
found in the western region 82 . The rest of Iran is made up of plateaus, high desert and coast
lines; all of which have the potential to be used for productive activities. The topography of each
area, besides two large salt lakes in western Iran, lends itself to provide a climate that is
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hospitable for living 83 . Furthermore, the population centers are located in the northern and
western portions of the country 84 . Even by comparing the oil field locations and population
density centers, the oil fields do not comprise a significant portion of the land. The point of
going over Iran's geographic and population density make-up was to show that oil does not
preoccupy the only livable land in Iran, and that other areas, in which many citizens live, are
capable of producing goods. This eliminates the argument that the land oil reserves occupy is so
vast, and in such highly important areas that there are not any other lands that are capable of
producing goods. The rather simple argument that Iran possesses enough land to allow citizens
to engage in economically productive activities, beyond the mercantlistic nature of "agriculture
and animal husbandry" and not affect oil revenues is important. This argument may seem
ancillary to the other more important issues such as conceptualization and expansion of private
property beyond government, but nonetheless this argument is important. This argument shows
that oil is not the culprit behind the non-economic means of hindering property rights, but rather
government policies are prohibiting private property rights for other reasons.
In terms of the economic perspective both oil and government structures contribute to the
anemic property rights of Iran. Oil contributes significantly to the overall direction of the
country economically. Oil also establishes the amount of subsidies the government can give to
the general public. By affording the Iranian government the opportunity to pass out huge
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subsidies, to its citizens oil has effectively inhibited citizens need to support themselves. Instead
government policies are allowed to bear the responsibility of supporting citizens. This is
especially true concerning private property rights. Property rights allow citizens to capitalize on
their own abilities and support themselves. However, when government policies are already
providing this support, the necessity of providing this right is not seen as something that is
advantageous to grant citizens. Authoritarian governments rarely grant unencumbered private
property rights. The sense of accomplishment that property rights provide citizens increases
their ability to survive and thrive outside of the state. From this perspective, oil does inhibit
private property rights, by providing government the means to dictate to citizens what they can
and can’t own.
In addition to the influence of oil the Iranian constitution is set up to limit the influence of
private citizens on the economy. Article forty-four of the Iranian constitution provides a rather
uncompromising and strict assessment of the roles of the state and private sector.
"The state sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major
minerals, banking, insurance, power generation, dams and large-scale irrigation
networks, radio and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping,
roads, railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the
State. The cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and enterprises
concerned with production and distribution, in urban and rural areas… The private
sector consists of… agriculture, animal husbandry, industry, trade, and services that
supplement the economic activities of the state and cooperative sectors." 85
This constitutional article already predisposes the government to inhibit property rights,
regardless of the movement of oil. Erasing the previous relationships created by the Shah was
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the reason for limiting property rights. Oil, through state issued subsidies, entrenches the
philosophy behind creating article forty-four. In recent years, government officials have made
attempts through economic planning, to reduce the economic supremacy of the state, and
promote the private citizen's role. Nonetheless, these economic reforms were geared towards
non private property aspects of economic liberalism. The attempts by politicians to not increase
property rights, but instead focus on other areas of economic liberalism are emblematic of the
problem facing the Iranian economy. The political structures and political leaders have
attempted to create economic diversification, but their efforts are guided in the wrong direction.
Economic diversification and expansion were created, when the government stops giving out
subsidies and incentives citizens to work and create, by allowing them to have ownership over
the value added activities that they add to raw materials.
In conclusion, the dynamic between the price of oil and property rights is partially
existent. However, the property rights data is insufficient to prove anything more than a partial
connection between the price of oil and property rights. The Iranian constitution, through such
works as article forty-four, has predisposed the current government to restrict property rights.
This predisposition is not the sole reason for restricting property rights. Subsidies provided by
oil revenues contribute to the lack of property rights. Subsidies allow government policies to
provide for citizens basic needs. Needs that would otherwise have to be taken care of by
providing for one's self. Property rights are the most essential element of alleviating that need.
Citizens know that the state policies will protect their product, idea or resource from an
encroachment by an outside entity.
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Trade Freedoms

The United States has severed many economic ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran. This
effectively eliminates the largest oil import market from one of the worlds' largest oil exporters.
Globalization still allows many other markets too still remain as destinations for Iranian
petroleum. Even with access to other markets, particularly the Chinese market, the volatility of
the price of oil has not changed. This keeps a reliance on natural resources as the predominant
means of economic activity risky for future economic stability. One means of reducing this
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economic dependency is relieving citizens and domestic corporations of the barriers that prohibit
trade with other states.
Like all other energy dependent economies, the Iranian economy over the last 10 years
has experienced the highs and lows the energy industry provides. Iran went from near
bankruptcy, with earning $20 a barrel in 1998, to experiencing windfall profits of near $140 a
barrel in 2007 (see Trade Freedoms graph). In the same period of time, the Iranians trade
freedoms experienced both positive and negative movements. Even with the erratic movement
trade freedoms have ultimately remained unchanged. The graph below shows a potential
relationship forming in 2001, but trade freedom experiences movement unrelated to that of the
price of oil. The original perception of oil revenues was allowing the country to diversify
economic sectors, through trade, preventing wild state revenue fluctuations. This view of
extracting the oil and reinvesting the profits into industrial developments is somewhat similar to
that of the Shah 87 . Since the overthrow of the Shah the government has viewed oil profits in a
different light. In the current political climate some possibility does exist for the price of oil to
influence the amount of trade freedoms granted. However, that influence will only work in
combination with the political institutions.
At the beginning of the price of oil revenue ascent, Iran had recently elected a new
president. President Khamati was very favorable to not only granting greater civil freedoms and
freedom of expression, but also in allowing the liberal free market to play a greater role in the
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economy. Trade freedoms during this period of time reached their highest point at just below 80
points. Throughout his presidency, 1997-2005, President Khatami made several movements
towards attempting to reconcile relations with Europe. The President visited Germany, France
and several other European states, and even speaking in conciliatory terms of the United States.
Besides verbally engaging European states, President Khatami produced his one and only
economic plan as president. The economic plan addresses several different liberal policies
including tax reforms and downsizing the government’s role in the economy 88 . However, the
economic plan did not have any specific remedies to increase the movement towards increasing
trade freedoms. Even without legislation and action directed towards trade issues, trade
freedoms experienced a free rider effect. Trade freedom benefited from reforms made in other
areas without any direct legislative action related to trade. The lack of direct reforms made to
trade freedom is one of the reasons, along with a lack of structural reform in the Iranian
constitution, behind the dearth in trade freedom 89 . Reforming trade policies have remained a
second or third tier issue within the Iranian government.
When President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2006 the country once again
shifted its philosophy on trade and oil. Since his inauguration, Mr. Ahmadinejad has been
known for his stance on domestic nuclear technology development. The president is also known
for continual making derogatory statements towards the state of Israel; not many other aspects of
the Iranian leader are published particularly concerning trade. Even with that, some progress
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concerning trade has been made in the Islamic Republic. An application to join the WTO was
submitted in 1996; although progress to join the organization has not moved forward until
2006 90 . Iran did not have any trade agreements with other countries until shortly after the
current president came to power. President Ahmadinejad entered into a free trade agreement
with Venezuela 91 . This FTA was largely symbolic and politically motivated rather than
sustentative; both countries main exports are petroleum based. The FTA was agreed upon to
show a unified front against the United States. Other movements to enhance trade freedom with
other countries have been made as the result of political motivations and strategic political
calculations; rather than the impact of a price of oil. President Ahmadinejad has been reluctant
to make the economy “export-oriented [or] growth- oriented” 92 . Any widespread changes or
actions towards trade would potentially disenfranchise the constituents, the poor, who ultimately
elected him president In addition to the lower classes; other centers of political power have been
extremely reluctant to increase trade freedoms. Institutions such as the merchant class, bonyads
93

and the Revolutionary Guard are concerned with further entrenching their own political and

economic interests 94 . Each of these establishments contains a significant amount of influence
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over political institutions as well as other sectors of the economy. Each institution has a vested
interest in seeing Iran remain an isolated community from the world’s trading forums.
The extent of the Iranian oil industries effect on the Iranian economy is widely known. A
significant portion of the economy is reliant to some capacity on the production and exportation
of oil. In conclusion, the trade freedoms granted is dependent upon the political philosophy of
the current Iranian president and other political constituencies rather than the price of oil. During
the late 1990’s the price of oil and trade freedoms began to climb with a president that was
hospitable to the liberal free market. However, the relationship between the two variables
became stagnant in 2001 and began to become an inverse relationship within the same president.
The regional event of the Iraq war, its impact on the supply of oil and fears of a potential US
invasion concerns were the initial underlying reasons for the shift in trade freedom and rise in the
price of oil. However, the Iraq war cannot be cited as a reason for the continued decline in trade
freedoms. Trade freedoms begin to increase while the American military was engaged in
constant battles with terrorist forces in Iraq, and fears of a US invasion of Iran were dissipating.
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Policy Implications
The results from this case study indicate that the negative movement in the price of
Iranian oil does not cause the state to liberalize business or trade sectors. This study also showed
oil only has a slight influence on property rights. Therefore, attempting to affect the supply and
demand of oil will not have the desired results of pushing the Iranian government towards the
three tested principles of economic liberalism. The implications for this study affect not only
other areas of international foreign policy but also domestic policy. One of the theories behind
energy independence is to remove the world's largest oil importer's demand for oil from the
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world market, causing the price of a barrel of oil to drop and therefore applying further economic
pressure on oil-dependent states 96 . The results from this study imply that such a move does not
force other countries to change their economic structures. Furthermore, the economic
importance of oil and growth of globalization allows Iran to find an oil market virtually
anywhere. Countries such as China and India now have access to vast amounts of oil to continue
to fuel their economic growth and at a cheaper price. The next potential ramification of
becoming energy independent is that America may be willing and able to make such a move, but
regional and other allies may not have the resources to make such a move. This move not only
allows Iran more regional markets for their product, which goes against the United States stated
position of isolating Iran, but these oil markets strengthen economic ties to American allies
creating a potential conflict of interests.
The movement towards business freedom is not something that is going to easily be
attainable in the Islamic Republic. In the course of the last 18 years Iran has produced three
economic plans with each aiming at reducing the role of government and promoting the private
sector. But, each economic plan has fallen short of its aspirations. Other economic reform
measures have aimed to curtail the power of judges, whom arbitrarily block foreign investment,
and the Council of Guardians 97 . This bill is unlikely to pass considering the Council of
Guardians must approve the bill. The reason behind the failures of such attempts at economic
reform is because Iran is not run by economists or businessmen; rather the country is governed
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by clerics and military personal. These leaders are going to be much more responsive to issues
of hard power rather than soft power. That is why the price of a barrel of oil (soft power)
fluctuations has failed to cause any structural economic change. Economic change was only
initiated after Iran realized the current economic system would not contribute in winning the
Iran-Iraq war. This doesn't mean that the leaders are unresponsive to economic situations and
concerns. To combat these economic concerns the Iranian government has examined a variety of
ways to increase the efficiency of their economy, the Iranian government is particularly
enthralled with the Chinese government and their economic efficiency while maintaining their
authoritarian rule 98 . However, the idea of the Iranians adopting a Chinese economic model is not
likely to happen. A change in economic systems won’t happen because the types of products
that the Chinese produce, elections and most importantly religion.
Considerations for business freedom in the American foreign policy agenda have paled in
comparison to the other much more pressing issues of nuclear proliferation and the support of
terrorism. For the last several years, America has conducted economic combat in the form of
sanctions instituted against Iran; congress passed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), later
named the Iranian Sanctions Act (ISA), and has been able to isolate the Iranian government from
foreign investment into its energy sector 99 . These sanctions "have not crippled Iran's economy
but have had an impact" 100 . Another part of the United States economic isolation of Iran is
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continually blocking attempts by the Iranian government to join the WTO, which the Iranian
government desperately wants to join. To deal with Iran, the State Department has approached
the Iranian government in the “P5+1” (US, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) talks
with an incentives package 101 . These talks are central concentrated around nuclear proliferation
and other hard power issues. The broader strategy for dealing with the Iranian government has
been instituted a five-pronged policy. This consists of:
"working at the United Nations and bilaterally to increase pressure on
Iran…applying U.S. financial sanctions on Iran's leading banks… convincing
leading European banks to stop all lending to Iran… discourage the Iranian
regimes support for terrorism and extremism… [and finally] stationed two carrier
battle groups in the Gulf to reassure our friends in the region 102 "
This five-pronged method has been effective in incorporating allies from across the globe as a
means isolating Iran. However, this move alone with not facilitate adequate economic change.
Under the current Iranian President and leadership of other institutions, direct interaction with
the government is not likely to aid in advancing Iran towards economic liberalism or the
rethinking of any current policies. There is only so much the United States can do when the
opposing governments ardently does not wish to change its policy. Therefore, a more direct
approach towards the general population needs to be employed. In addition to the political and
economic isolation, the state department has designated millions in economic funding for
“democracy, educational, and cultural programs” geared towards the Iranian people. A separate
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section of these programs needs to be directly applied to promoting and explaining how the
benefits of business freedom, and economic liberalism, and how these actions alleviate the
countries high unemployment and inflation. Instituting this program, much like the other
programs, will surely be difficult. However, a proactive action on all fronts needs to be
instituted other than mere isolation.
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CHAPTER 4: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

Brief History

Unlike the previous two case studies, which possess long illustrative oil histories, the oil
history and general history, of the United Arab Emirates is relatively new to the world scene. In
the last quarter of a century, the seven sheikhdoms emirates (Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai,
Fujairah, Ra’s al–Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al–Qawain) have come together to form one of
the most influential oil producing states in the gulf. Two of the Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai,
when compared against the other five emirates, have a longer history of oil production that dates
back to the 1950's 103 . Even with the discovery of oil, these two Emirates did not export oil until
the mid 1960's. In the 1960’s, the UAE joined the powerful OPEC organization 104 even before
the country had agreed on a provisional constitution on December 2, 1971. Shortly after their
inception to OPEC, the United Arab Emirates established the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
(ADNOC) to control the production of oil 105 . In the time shortly after forming a country, the
UAE benefited from the extreme increase in the price of oil. The revenues derived from oil were
considered an essential factor in the continuity of keeping the states together 106 . The UAE's first

103

ADMA-OPCO. "Oil Industry in UAE." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlNOrdGyhaE
"Brief History." The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 1 Oct. 2008
<http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm>.
105
"Discovery of Oil." United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2007. 29 Sept. 2008
<http://uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2007/english_2007/eyb3.pdf>.
106
Heard–Bey, Frauke. "The United Arab Emirates: A Quarter Century of Federation." Middle East Dilemma; The
70
104

president, His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, recognized the need for not only
using oil profits to improve the lives of his citizens. His Highness also engaged economic
diversification. The UAE is engaging in economic diversification by creating a medical city,
"Dubialand", Disneyland in the Desert 107 , an internet city and various other large scale projects.
These large scale projects have contributed to the minimization the economic impact in the
fluctuations of the price of oil. However, even with the attempted economic minimization of oil,
oil still accounts for a high proportion of the government revenue; accounting for roughly onethird of the United Arab Emirates' gross national" 108 . According to the Energy Information
Agency, the UAE continues to remain dependent on oil for growing their economy 109 ;
particularly considering the UAE will expand their oil production capacity by 650,000 barrels
per day (BPD) in the next two years 110 .
Even with economic success provided by oil revenues, the country still faces internal
domestic struggles. These domestic problems concern a variety of issues that include the states'
economic structures. These economic structures are based off of state ownership and cause an
increasing number of the male population to rely on the state 111 . The state has prevented instead
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of developed the entrepreneurial spirit. This spirit is needed to drive the innovation and
creativity that is required to guide the UAE towards its goals of becoming a regional, and then
eventual international knowledge center. As a result of these goals, will a historical reliance on
mercantilism prevent the changes towards tenant’s economic liberalism?

Price of Oil and the Politics of Business Freedoms

When compared against the previous two case studies, the United Arab Emirates has
been continually willing to minimize policies that interfere with businesses ability to function.
The Heritage Foundation consistently ranks the UAE among the regional leaders in reducing the
political influence government possess in the business environment. Even with this traditional
role of limiting government, recent years have seen a reversal in this states’ economic thinking.
During the time period being analyzed, government policies have been increasingly active in the
business community. Simultaneously, the value of the price of oil has increased exponentially.
Traditionally, the seven Emirates have relied on the price of oil to stabilize their economy. The
government has managed to move beyond oil, and create an atmosphere that is very conducive to
private enterprise.
Various proclamations have been put forth, by the Minister of the Economy, Sheikha
Lubna Al Qasimi, and other political leaders to demonstrate the UAE’s commitment towards
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principles of maintaining a liberal economic policy 112 . However, the data below (see business
freedom graph-UAE) illustrates the degree to which businesses are able to function without state
interference has slowly been dissipating. The Ministry of the Economy's own' website
exemplifies the contradiction between expanding government policies and increasing economic
liberalism. The website states the need for new legislation, but also to increase the attractiveness
of investment and creating a competitive economic climate 113 . The call for new legislation its
self does not hurt the business environment; if the legislation calls for granting greater autonomy
of the business community from the state. The call for new legislation combined with the data
showing an apparent connection between the price of oil 114 and decreasing business freedoms
present a rather disconcerting situation. Prior to the turn of the millennium, the UAE was
concerned with growing foreign capital investment and adding foreign private sector
involvement into infrastructure development 115 . However, the discrepancy between policies of
government intervention and private sector development arose. Capital investments allow the
purchase of businesses, but foreigners are only granted minority ownership. This contributes
heavily in an individuals' ability to open a business. In further examining the data, the number of
procedures and time required to open a business, in addition to the time required to close a
business have remained unchanged. The stagnant nature of these variables directly contradicts
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the governments stated policy of moving towards market friendly policies. Furthermore, out of
the three case studies, the UAE has the longest time period required in closing a business at 5.1
years. All of this has occurred with the price of oil perpetually increasing. Like the previous two
case studies this indicates the country is suffering from severe employment problems. This
factor is an important factor for determining business freedom and increases the political activity
in the business environment. This factor alone does demonstrate the political involvement in the
business environment is due to reasons beyond the price of oil.
One manor where the government has taken concern in encroaching upon businesses is
the prices that consumers must pay. The government has recently imposed fines on a company
from Kuwait for raising their prices 116 . The UAE government has also begun a preemptive
investigation into companies raising prices during Ramadan 117 . The government intervention
occurred not during a national crisis, or an unexpected state of emergency (hurricane, flood,
drought, fire) to which all citizens were forced to suffer through. The investigation took place
during a religious festival to insulate certain citizens from experiencing an increase in prices.
The inability of government policies to let market forces determine business prices is part of the
continual decrease in business freedoms.
In some ways, the UAE’s two most important economic centers represent a microcosm of
the natural resource curse. Abu Dhabi is very wealthy with oil and has been reluctant to make
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the necessary liberal economic changes. Dubai only possesses a very modest amount of oil and
has taken the necessary steps to liberalize its economic structures making them much more freemarket friendly. In general, this dichotomy is emblematic of the United Arab Emirates, and their
attempts to engage in limiting the amount of political input into the business environment. In
conclusion, the linkage between the price of oil and controlling government policies concerning
business freedoms is not proven. While factors indicate a linkage may exist between the two,
cavalcades of other reasons indicate the government has chosen simply to reform other areas of
the economy and not the business sector. The federal UAE government was supposed to reform
the "Sole Agency Act 118 " but that action drew massive protests from the general public119 . The
government has focused liberalization efforts into other areas than business. The government
has been particularly active in freeing the financial and financial services sectors; in hopes of
becoming a global epicenter for investment. The price of oil allows the government to chose,
which sectors are liberalized and which ones are not.
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Table 12 Business Freedoms in the UAE
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Property Rights

Many states in this region of the world find the idea of land ownership, owning other
resources or intellectual property rights by private citizens/entities contemptuous and prohibit
such actions. In times of economic malaise, states must rethink this theory and begin to allow
private ownership. Private ownership provides the necessary catalyst to spark the economic
growth that must take place. States may make the necessary policy reforms to prevent
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government interference, and promote a free market based system when times are hard. The true
test of states commitment liberalization arrives in times of prosperity. The United Arab Emirates
makes the claim that they are moving towards inhibiting policies from perpetually interacting
and interfering with the free market. While that is the case in some respects, when looking at
property rights little evidence can be found to support that claim (see Property Rights graphUAE). In a span of ten years property rights have dropped more than half (fifty points). The
continually erosion of property rights is an incessant problem in capturing their goal of becoming
a global financial centers. The drastic drop in property rights has transpired at nearly the same
rate of the rise in the price of oil. Outside of the influence of oil, there are several other
explanations for the drop in property rights.
The first potential reason for exculpating the price of oil as the reason for the lack of
property rights is the strategic choice of government. The United Arab Emirates has explicitly
stated and shown that the limitation of political involvement in certain sectors of the economy is
a cognitive choice. The strategic choice of identifying which aspects of the economy to limit
government involvement and which to continue government involvement is a decision that
involves political motivations rather than the influence of a resource. Enacting economic
reforms in property rights is not a zero-sum game. The price of oil is not preventing the states
from liberalizing other aspects of the economy. This makes the limitations of government
policies in certain economic aspects a strategic choice. Furthermore, oil does not possess the
ability to choose which economic aspects that allow government is to diminish its role.
Therefore, from this perspective, political choices, not oil is the reason lack of property rights.
The second aspect of property rights extends beyond the mere ownership of land.
77

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) differs from other property rights. This distinction between
the two sets of property rights is important because of the nature of each property. A state only
has a limited amount of livable land combined with an ever expanding population, while
intellectual property is not confined to a definitive amount. In the technological driven 21st
century the rights of intellectual property mean as much to rights concerning land ownership.
The protection of these rights means more to foreign investors whom are allowed to own only a
diminutive amount of land, but whose products may span the entire country. Due to this
importance, as a measure of reassurance to foreign investors, all of the Emirates decided that
action needed to be taken at the federal level 121 . In 2002, near the beginning of the property
rights decent the UAE, to protect authors and artists, enacted the Federal Author and Copyrights
and Parallel Rights Law No. 7 122 . The support for enhancing IRP laws has continually
strengthened. Strides have been made by ministers to protect software producers and others
whom wish to develop products. The intentions for enabling property rights reforms stems from
the group that would benefit the most from these reforms; foreign investors. Part of the UAE's
plans for economic diversification, away from oil, heavily involves attracting foreign investors.
Even with the previous two reasons, to gain a true sense of the actual influence of oil in
granting property rights, one must analyze actual property. The UAE has designated certain
areas within the country as Free Trade Zones (FTZ). Within these FTZ’s citizens of any foreign
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country may own property; however the potential problem occurs outside of the FTZ's. The
problem originates in the lack of a federal law about "freehold property 123 ." The problem
concerning freehold property ownership involves expatriates and foreign nationals; not UAE
citizens. The UAE has a unique law that the federal government does not explicitly prohibit or
grant expatriates the ability to own property. Rather property rights decisions are left up to
individual states 124 . Citizens of any UAE emirate are allowed the right of ownership in any of
the emirates. But citizens of fellow GCC states are allowed the ability to own property however
only in state designated area. Citizens of other foreign states are only granted the ability to lease
the land 125 . Problems such as this cause concern among foreign nationals or foreign companies
looking at buying property within the Emirate. This aspect of the problem is not entirely
political. The lack of unanimity among the collective group of emirates, concerning a property
rights law, predisposes the problem to that of a political disagreement. Comparing and
contrasting Abu Dhabi and Dubai provides an accurate gage to the nature of this problem.
Abu Dhabi and Dubai are responsible for a majority of the trading activity that occurs
within the UAE, and each provides this function in dramatically different way. Abu Dhabi has
vast amounts of oil wealth. Dubai must engage in other functions to perform well economically.
The property rights laws in each emirate differ in minor ways, but these minor differences are
substantial. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi, as recently as 2005 limited the individuals that are able
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to own property, and limited the places property can be owned 126 . This legislation limited
ownership anywhere to only UAE citizens. Citizens of Gulf Cooperation Council states are able
to own property in investment zones. Citizens of all other states have the ability to enter into
long term lease (ninety-nine years) agreements. According to the legislation, this law supersedes
any and all other pieces of legislation concerning property ownership. Dubai has laws that are
more hospitable to citizens from other states. Except in one way, citizens of other states are
granted ownership within specific investment areas. Shortly after Dubai enacted this legislation
the other five emirates, besides Abu Dhabi, and all of whom do not possess the oil resources that
Abu Dhabi possess, enacted similar pieces of legislation127 . By six of the seven emirates
ratifying pieces of legislation that grant ownership, even if on a limited basis, to non-UAE
citizens while the one emirate that possess vast amounts of oil wealth still will not. This is the
best indicator for establishing the price of oil has an effect on property rights within the UAE.
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Price of Oil and the Politics of Trade Freedoms

The United Arab Emirates has continually shown the ability to keep the states presence
very limited when dealing with trade issues. From 1998-2007, the trade freedom ranking
consistently remained in the mid to high eighties. Not only is this ranking one of the best in the
region, but compares very favorably to the world leaders ranking. The UAE has participated in
trade organizations and trade agreements during times when low oil revenue warranted looking
at different sources for revenue. The UAE has consistently lowered the amount of state policies
governing trade freedoms when oil revenues have increased. This provides ample opportunity
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for the state to reinsert itself into this sector of business. Like the previous two case studies trade
sector analysis, simply looking at the export/import data does not provided the proper assessment
of whether or not oil revenues are, to any extent, involved in the process of determining
government involvement in trading barriers. For this perspective to be surmised a proper
analysis of trade freedom, tariff and non-tariff barriers, needs to be analyzed. Enacting trade
freedoms have occurred in two basic forms. Through reducing barriers to become a part of trade
organizations. Making the necessary reductions to trade barrier could occur outside of the
influence on the trade organizations. Entering into free trade agreements or any type of trade
agreement with other states requires the reduction of barriers to gain greater access to their
markets. States that rely on oil, as in the previous two case studies, have within the last several
years come to realize the importance of actual reducing state enacted barriers to become part of
these groups. The UAE for many years has realized importance of reducing state policies via the
trade agreements. In 1995 the UAE joined the WTO. Entry into the WTO was contingent on a
ten-year probationary period. In that time, the country was required to reduce certain barriers;
seven of the ten years on probation occurred during the time period under examination in this
paper. The country completed reducing these barriers and was granted full WTO status.
Inclusion to the WTO has opened up many avenues for the UAE to enter into various other free
trade agreements; with an assortment of states including an FTA with the United States. Many
of the free trade agreements have come during the extreme rise in oil profits. The UAE has not
stopped creating trade partnerships since joining the WTO.
Free trade agreements are the primary means in today’s globalized economic cultural for
reducing trade barriers. FTA’s have gained in usage because they provide a strategic advantage
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of reducing government policies for one state while other states operating outside of FTA’s are
subject to higher costs entry costs. In the early 1980’s, during the Iran-Iraq war and lackluster
performance of oil revenues, the UAE joined the Gulf Cooperation Council. In 2001 the council
was expanded to become a customs union. The original purpose of the GCC was created as a
deterrence measure against the Iran-Iraq war and the continued Iranian aggression 129 . In 2005, a
strictly economic agreement between the GCC countries was reached creating the Greater Arab
Free Trade Area (GAFTA). Much like the GCC, GAFTA is a customs union that seeks greater
economic integration among Arab League members. In 1998, when the price of oil was at its
lowest point in years, the UAE had been a part of the world trade organization for three years.
Besides participating in trade agreements the UAE government has also streamlined their
customs unions to increase their efficiency 130 .
Free trade agreements are a common measure to determine if countries are serious about
reducing the number of tariff and non tariff barriers. During the time period under examination,
many of the reforms enacted by the United Arab Emirates governments have been geared
towards enticing multinational companies to either invest or perform some type of commerce
within the country. The UAE recognizes the blessing that oil has provided their state. The UAE
is not willing to rest of its laurels of just possessing this resources and not making progress in
other economic forums. One example of this judicious pursuit of continually advancing the
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governments' economic reform is by reducing government policies in the aviation industry. By
freeing the aviation industry from the restrictions imposed by government the UAE has been able
to achieve their goals of tourism 131 . The reduction of barriers has not merely peaked in the
manifestation of the aviation industry. The Minister of the Economy, Sheikha Lubna Al
Qassimi, has continued to push the lowering of government mandated requirements in the
financial and housing sectors 132 . The state realized by removing themselves and barriers from
the ability of individual actors of foreign states to engage commerce that the state will reach its
goals. Another aspect that has allowed the state to thrive in attracting foreign companies is free
trade zones. FTZ’s are not anything new to this region with some states choosing to participate
in them and other states opting to abstain from their use. The UAE chose the former, electing to
participate in the use of FTZ’s.
Reaching trade agreements with other states and organizations can effectively diversify
countries away from a reliance on a sole commodity, industry or domestic market place for
goods. The UAE is one of the few countries in this region that has long embraced this idea. This
has occurred despite the perceived risk of limiting their own governmental influence on the
domestic economy and allowing the free market, foreign competition and investment to enter.
By enacting reforms and promoting them-selves as a center for regional trade. As the graph
indicates the government has remained vigilant in limiting their interaction with concern to
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erecting, both tariff and non-tariff, barriers that would inhibit trade. The trade freedom ranking
has consistently remained in the mid eighties, while the price per barrel oil rose more than fifty
dollars per barrel. The Emirates governments recognize that by limiting their influence in trade,
unlike the two previous case studies, that the overall country will benefit. The promotion of
trade occurred concurrently with the price of oil growing rapidly. Oil still remains a significant
and stabilizing force in the economy, due to the extreme potential revenues that can be gained,
but oil was an inconsequential factor in determining whether or not to limit government
involvement in trade.
The price of oil has no effect on whether or not the state will reduce trade barriers. For
many years now the UAE has in one form or another been a part of a trade agreement; even
becoming a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the predecessor to
the WTO. Trade agreements have a part of the UAE for many years, during times when the state
received dearth oil revenue and times when oil revenues were at record pace. Because a
significant cornerstone of the United Arab Emirates plans to become a key part of the global
economic society concerns reducing the barriers to trade and investment. As evidence by the
number and extent of the reductions of government included in trade freedom accords. These
reforms have not only be instituted as part of free trade agreements but also by the state as part of
the economic development plan.
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Table 14 Trade Freedoms in the UAE
Price of Oil ($) and Trade
Freedom Ranking
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Policy Implications

The United Arab Emirates is one of the most essential allies the United States possesses
in the Middle East region. This relationship is not impervious to outside factors. In 2006, after a
large public outcry the United States congress blocked the Dubai Ports World Group from
purchasing several strategic seaports. While the potential did arise for this incident to injure the
economic relationship, and potentially damage other strands of this relationship, between the
countries that has not occurred. The UAE has strengthened its economic ties to the United States
promoting a pro growth economic strategy based upon reducing the amount of government
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involvement within the business environment. In a global sense the UAE still has many changes
that they can make to continue reducing governments input within the business community;
particularly with business' freedoms and property rights. Expecting this country to become a
regional version of the United States or Great Britain, in terms of the amount of governments
limitations in the business environment, is ill-conceived and naïve. However, in regional terms
the UAE is significantly ahead of many other states in incorporating economic reform principles
and restricting governments input in individual business decisions. The other two states involved
in this study have made overtures to limiting government involvement in business sectors and
opening up those sectors to the principles of a free market system. Currently, these moves have
been slightly more than lip service. While true, that some reforms have taken place, the speed
and scope of these reforms does not rival the moves instituted by the United Arab Emirates. The
results of this study indicate two different related outcomes. The first outcome is that oil, on a
federal level, does not influence whether or not the government will undertake limiting political
involvement within the domestic business scene. When dealing with issues that are not yet under
the federal authority oil does have a minimal amount influence in certain areas (property rights)
inside specific emirates (Abu Dhabi). Therefore, one of the closest allies of the US is not going
to have change economic policies merely due to the fluctuations in the price of a barrel of oil.
The second discover is that, on the federal level, any economic reform is the cognitive choice of
the states rulers to move in that direction. This UAE is actively attempting to limit their
government's involvement in specific economic aspects to help promote the free market system.
The United States relationship with the United Arab Emirates is critical not only in the
promotion of continuing economic reform, but also for regional stability.
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During his administration, President Bush fortified the US economic relationship with the
UAE through several strategic initiatives. The first initiative was the Middle East Free Trade
Initiative (MEFTA) 134 . In this initiative, the UAE along with several states entered into free
trade agreements with the US. This agreement has moved each state into further economic
alignment with one another and further facilitated an economic system that removes government
imposed restrictions on products and investments. The second area concerns a variety of
different initiatives. These initiatives are based upon promoting reform and openness within
varying Middle East societies and these organizations are not mutually exclusive to the United
States and the UAE; organizations such as the G-8 and other Middle East states are participants
in these groups. Some of these programs are the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 135 or
the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA). Each of these initiatives offers a range of
programs that vary between reforming political, economic and social aspects of society. The US
and others may be able to offer programs to assist in the transition of economic philosophies, but
the US cannot force other states to make the necessary changes to any aspect of their society 136 .
For true change in the aforementioned areas, the region must have a leader and each state must
not only make the choice to take part in these reforms, but actually implement some of the
measures. States in the region that should be the leaders in reform, struggle themselves to make
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the necessary reforms. This provides the smaller states like UAE the opportunity to not merely
lead by example, but the opportunity to convince other states that reforms need to be made. The
UAE presents one of the few states in the region that possess both the trust of fellow Arab
countries and that of the United States. For the United States to accomplish their goals of turning
around the economic system in these countries allowing the UAE and other similar states to
become proactive in not just merely being involved in the international financial system, but
allowing the UAE to take the desperately needed economic leadership role the region needs. The
establishment of one particular state, UAE, or a small group of states (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait,
and Jordan ECT) as a leader in the region is critical for success not only economically but in
other more volatile areas.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

The minimal influence of oil

For many states in the world, oil has become the currency for making decisions.
Global powers, such as China are concerned about their overall economic growth and the ability
to increasingly provide jobs for their citizens. Oil is the essential resource that will drive this
economic growth. China's pursuit of this resource has caused a global condemnation for the
atrocities that have occurred in the Sudan. In exchange for access to the Sudanese oil fields,
China has been and continually is willing to overlook the genocide within Sudan 137 . In August
of 2008, a dispute between Russia and, the former soviet republic, Georgia broke out.
Originally, the dispute involved break away areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Regardless of
the stated reason, oil played a factor in the Russian decision making process to invade Georgia.
Georgia had become an alternative energy supply route for Europe. This supply route
diminished European dependency upon Moscow for energy 138 . Even the United States has been
erroneously been accused of acting in a manor to increase the supply of energy markets.
Countries are willing to go to extraordinary lengths to satisfy their need for energy resources.
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This willingness grants states supplying energy resources, the complacency to add liberalize
markets and permit government policies to remain tightly intertwined with business
environment. In order to properly measure whether this phenomenon is in effect in the Middle
East, this paper chose states that possessed a considerable amount of energy resources. The key
difference between the individual governments' was their policy to interfere with the political
business environment. All of the states chosen (Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab
Emirates) were based in the Persian Gulf region of the Middle East. This region is extremely
important in not only the production and transportation of global oil supplies, but also in terms of
regional stability. This studies importance goes to the heart of whether a mercantilistic economic
system, inhibits a state to moving to an economic system based on liberal principles.
The first case study examined Saudi Arabia. The results of the case study indicate that
the price of oil provides some support for the governments' policy of involvement in the business
world (see table 15). The price of oil finances government policies of intervention through the
use of subsidies to citizens. Subsidies in turn allow the government to remain entrenched in a
mercantilism, which inhibits the need for any restrictions of governments' policies in the
business community. Even with the subsidies, government officials have still made attempts to
liberalize the economic system. Each attempt at business reform brings the state closer to its
goal of liberalization. However, the liberalization attempts were created and instituted by
government officials whom seem to be the ones concerned with actually prohibiting
liberalization efforts. The political interference with property rights is another area the
government is reluctant to bequeath back to the citizens. The state involvement in property
rights is only partially built upon property rights (see table 15). While the price of oil does a
91

small role, most of the involvement in property rights is built upon the governments own
discretion of priorities and policy choices. In terms of oil revenues affect on trade, oil does not
appear to have an effect (see table 15). Even with the price of oil increasing, the Saudi
government has joined trading organizations (WTO) and decreased the barriers in regional
customs unions (GCC). Nonetheless, the actual implementation of trade liberalization is still an
area of concern for the Saudi government. The Saudi government still has a policy of
sanctioning the generation and enforcement of a negative list. The overall lack of a relationship
in each of the three principles of economic liberalism is not because of oil. Rather the lack of
movement towards economic liberalism stems from the political choices made by government
officials. The lack of a relationship between oil and economic liberalism means that
manipulating the market forces of supply and demand will not cause the Saudi government to
change its economic course. This means the strategic political choices of the Saudi government
are the reasons for the continued heavy involvement in the affairs of the economy. Moreover,
the geopolitical position of Saudi Arabia and the American military use of Saudi land make
direct confrontation over decreasing the governments' policy choices in the business world
extremely unlikely. Rather allowing the WTO and other financial institutions to be the primary
means of moving the Saudi government towards greater liberalization of businesses, property
rights and trade.
The Iranian case study provided results that were similar to the Saudi Arabian case study.
Government policies in both states play the predominant role in maintaining a mercantilistic
economic philosophy. In many, but not all instances, the ability of the government to reduce the
mercantilistic nature of the domestic economy is not influenced by the price of oil, but rather by
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strategic political choice. In examining the liberal economic tenant of business freedoms, the
revenue generated by oil only partially explain the government's willingness to increasingly
participate in the business world (see table 15). For Iran, this interaction is the result of
balancing different political constituencies. Oil revenues play a role by providing the financial
resources to enable government policies that create a society dependent upon the state for basic
goods. In determining the effect the price of oil has a small role in influencing property rights
(see table 15). The amount of property rights, throughout the years being examined, was
extremely low making a link between oil and property rights difficult. The subsidies provided by
the price of oil establish a minimal connection to property rights. Subsidies artificially inflate
citizen's incomes and prevent the need for property rights as means of liberalizing the market
place. But a majority of government policies on property rights originate from sources other
than the price of oil. At the inception of the Islamic Republic, granting property rights to
citizens' was inhibited. Furthermore, out of the three states being examined Iran, possesses the
most diverse landscape. With oil fields only comprising a small amount of land in the western
portion of the state, this landscape presents the opportunity for many different activities to be
performed. However, the proper incentives (property rights) to utilize the land have not been
implemented. In the final section, trade liberalization was also prohibited by government and not
the price of oil (see table 15). In the beginning of the relationship between the price of oil and
trade freedom a semblance of a relationship existed but that potential quickly vanished. For most
of the years being examined the efforts to start economic liberalization efforts were dependent
upon the political environment within the state.
For several years now the United States policy has been to isolate Iran economically from
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the world markets; for the actions of attempting to proliferation nuclear weapons. This isolation
has done little to facilitate political change towards a liberal economic philosophy. Allowing
Iran to become part of the globalized economic community only risks re-entrenching the political
position. This political position is policy actions in other areas (nuclear proliferation, support for
terrorism) will not have any impact on becoming a member of the entire global market place.
Recent policies of the United States have involved a multilateral approach with other global
powers. The international community and the United States citizens do not have the stomach,
nor the resources, for another coup d tea. Therefore the diplomatic approach is the most
palatable political solution.
In the final case study, the UAE presented the most comprehensive example of the effect
of the price of oil on tenants of economic liberalism (business freedom, property rights and trade
freedom). The UAE has seven emirates. One of the emirates, Abu Dhabi, is oil rich and has
been reluctant to make the necessary liberal economic changes. While another emirate, Dubai,
only possess a very modest amount of oil. Dubai has also taken the necessary steps to reform its
economic structures making friendlier to liberal free-market principles. The movement to
economic liberalism was the cognitive choice of political leaders. Unlike the previous two case
studies, this was not only political decision to create a liberal economic system, but an actual
policy choice to implement that system. The results from the study could not establish a link
between the price of oil and political involvement in the business world (see table 15). During
the time being examined a negative relationship between the price of oil and business freedoms
appeared to exist. However, a significant amount of information shows that a government choice
to liberalize other sectors of the economy and not the business sector. The lack of liberalization
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in business was due to the governments' strategic choice and not the price of oil. When
examining property rights the price of oil does play a role (see table 15). Dubai does not rely
upon the sale of oil as the primary means to finance the local government. As a result foreigners
are allowed the right to own property; even though that right is limited to specific areas. Abu
Dhabi is the only emirate that prohibits foreigners from owning property; instead the government
institutes a policy of allowing foreigners the right to lease property in certain areas. The final
section examines the price of oil on trade liberalization. The results indicate that the price of oil
does not influence trade freedom. For many years now the UAE has been involved in trade
agreements, and is a leader regional movement to solidifying trade relationships. The
persistence in creating these trade relationships has taken place regardless of the price of oil or
the political situation in the region. In examining the data despite the ever increasing revenues
from oil, the amount of trade liberalism remained extremely high. In combination with
continually pursuing a liberal economic policy, regardless of the price of oil, the UAE has
become involved in initiatives that promote regional economic reform. The continued pursuit of
economic liberalism, while maintaining their close relationship with other regional states (Iraq,
Saudi Arabia) makes the UAE an ideal state to demonstrate the benefits of economic liberalism.
Each of the three case studies returned very similar results; policy choices contribute
more than the price of oil to determining the extent of political involvement in the business
community. Authors such as Karl and Stijns were correct in their assessment that policy use of
natural resources, not the natural resource its' self, determines economic parameters. This study
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continues to build upon the previous authors works. This study diminishes the natural resource
curse theory 139 to a secondary role, behind the governments thought concerning the role of the
state in the economy. Governments in this part of the world operate from a certain political
perspective that recognizes the importance of oil, but does not allow the movement of oil to
dictate rearranging this policy perspective. The natural resource curse was examined using states
with different levels of political involvement in the business sector. The results indicated that the
natural resource curse only partially exists. Two of the three case study states, Saudi Arabia and
Iran, were already inclined to prevent economic liberalism. This inclination was not the result of
the price of oil, but rather by other political factors. Subsidies, provided by an increase in the
price of oil, contributed in the extent government policies encroach on economic activity. The
government encroachment would have occurred in spite of the price of oil. The United Arab
Emirates also proved the natural resource curse is secondary to government policies; except in
property rights. For the Persian Gulf, policy choices supersede the revenue provided by the
price of oil. Natural resources may provide easy access to desperately need revenue for states.
But, in many instances, states will prohibit the movement to reducing political involvement in
businesses regardless of the movement of the price of oil. This leaves little doubt that changing
political behavior cannot be influenced through economic means. Many of the governments'
policy choices come from a predetermined set of beliefs as to the role of government in the
economy. Future areas of study should include in, what factors determine how the government
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should interact in the economy and the prioritization of the economic concerns compared to other
domestic concerns. Another area of future study should include are the principles of economic
liberalism incompatible with the conceptualization of the states interaction with the economy.
Studying these areas will allow for better understanding of how Persian Gulf states prioritize the
economy and view the economies role in the state. More importantly though, studying these
areas provides an assessment of whether considerable movement towards economic liberalism is
possible.

Table 15 Overall Case Study Results

Country
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia
Iran
Iran
Iran
UAE
UAE
UAE

Hypothesis
Price of Oil Æ Business Freedoms
Price of Oil Æ Property Right
Price of Oil Æ Trade Freedoms
Price of Oil Æ Business Freedom
Price of Oil ÆProperty Right
Price of Oil Æ Trade Freedom
Price of Oil Æ Business Freedoms
Price of Oil Æ Property Right
Price of Oil Æ Trade Freedom

Results
Partial Relationship
Partial Relationship
No Relationship
Partial Relationship
Partial Relationship
No Relationship
No Relationship
Relationship
No Relationship

Implications for Iraq

The Persian Gulf holds other states than the three previous case studies. One of these
states, Iraq, is central to current American foreign policy. Prior to 2003, the American
government has had a turbulent relationship with Iraq and its former leader. Throughout the
1980's the United States supported Saddam Hussein against the Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. That
support vanished when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in late 1990. After the Persian Gulf
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War, the United States implemented United Nations (UN) sponsored sanctions against Iraq.
Those sanctions ended via the American Invasion of Iraq in 2003. The American invasion
started a strenuous and demanding journey to place a democratic society in the hands of the Iraqi
people. In January of 2005, Iraq made progress towards its democratic goals by holding its first
ever free and fair election. This move was the initial starting point of Iraq becoming a self
sustaining government. As part of this process, benchmarks were created to completely
reconcile the country. One of the most essential elements of this reconciliation is the institution
of an economic system. This economic system must respect the private sector and restricts
government policies intervening in the economy.
An important aspect of the reconciliation for the Iraqi state concerns the economic
conditions in the state. According to General David Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan
Crocker, the Iraqi government has made legislative strides to liberal reform. The Iraqi
government has reformed the regulatory framework governing businesses and promoted the
private sector 140 . The timing of instituting the necessary legislative acts to liberalize the
economy presents a quandary for the American and Iraqi political establishment. Releasing
industries and sectors from government control too soon could cause security setbacks; due to
the increase in the possible amount of attacks on soft political targets. These attacks cause
people to become unwilling to take the appropriate business risks that a liberal economic system.
Also pushing a liberal economic system could fail due to the lack of security and poison the Iraqi
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people towards that type of economic system. Instituting the necessary changes to promote a
free market based system too late, and citizens have started to become reliant upon oil revenues.
While this will not completely prohibit liberal reforms, the drive to become self sufficient and
not continuously rely on government policies is diminished. Regardless of other factors that
have the potential to impede economic liberalization, security remains the primary issue of
concern. According to General Petraeus, the "lack of adequate security remains the largest
impediment to increased private economic activity" 141 . As long as security concerns remain an
issue, citizens and foreign corporations will be beyond reluctant to engage in any form of
economic development. The timing between instituting liberal economic principles and
obtaining security is crucial to both. Therefore, liberalizing the economy must be slower than
that of the progress made in increasing security. The ratio of security benchmarks to economic
liberalization benchmarks needs to occur at a pace of three to one. At this pace citizens and
foreign investors can be assured that the government is not just making temporary security gains.
Rather the Iraqi government is making significant and actual long term security gains. The
security benchmarks provide a sense of stability to regions within the country, the overall
country itself and foreign investors within the state. By also reaching the security benchmarks
the citizens can begin to feel a sense of stability. This stability lets citizens devote themselves
towards endeavors other than their survival. The three to one ratio also slowly familiarizes the
free market system to a population that in the last four generations has been subject to
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authoritarian rule. For citizens that have not directly participated in a liberal economic system
the initial shock can be overwhelming. A liberal economic system can appear harsh, violent and
cold to those who are unfamiliar with participating in it. Therefore, policy steps need to be taken
to assuage the initial fears of the population. Policy choices, such as gradually reducing trade
barriers, allowing greater property rights for citizens, and reducing the time required to close a
business are beneficial to the population.
One should not expect a purely liberal market system in Iraq, with government policies
completely abstaining from the economic environment. However, an economic system based on
principles of the free market system is extremely reasonable to expect. In conducting the three
previous case studies, the price of oil was found to have minimal affect on influencing liberal
economic policies. Rather the liberal economic policies had to be pursued by each countries
government. Therefore, the United States must make sure the Iraqi government is actively
making policy choices that support a liberal economic system. The consequences in not pursing
policies based on economic liberalism present a dire scenario. Resulting in an Iraqi population
that once again relies on state policy and state issued subsidies for their economic survival,
instead of relying on themselves. To familiarize the Iraqi citizens with a liberal economy, these
policy choices must happen on a slow but consistent basis. For the United States and the citizens
of Iraq, the Iraqi government reliance on the price of oil to support economic policy cannot be
accepted. The Iraqi peoples' economic situation will not have improved if they rely on
government provided subsidies. For the Iraqi people and economy to thrive in the future,
government policies must include not relying on oil to provide for economic survival. Rather
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policy initiatives must be aimed at reducing the political involvement in the business community,
and letting people determine their own future through economic liberalism.

101

REFERENCES
2006 Investment Climate Statement -- Saudi Arabia. The United States of America. State
Department. <http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2006/62029.htm>.
Accessions; Iran." Status of accession working party. 26 May 2005. World Trade Organization. 1
Aug. 2008 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_iran_e.htm>.
ADMA-OPCO. "Oil Industry in UAE." http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlNOrdGyhaE
Al Qasim, Sheikha L. "Economic Impact of Liberalization." ICAO Global Symposium on Air
Transport Liberalization, 18 Sept. 2006, Dubai, UAE. Ministery of the Economy. United
Arab Emirates. 8 Oct. 2008
<http://www.economy.ae/english/mediasection/speeches/pages/year2006.aspx>.
Alm, Richard, and Stephen Brown. "Running on Empty? How Economic Freedom Affects Oil
Supplies." Economic Letter—Insights From the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 1 (2006).
<http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2006/el0604.html>.
Ascher, William. Why Governments Waste Resources: The Political Economy of Natural
Resource Policy Failures in Developing Countries. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1999.
Auty, Richard M. Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies : The Resource Curse Thesis.
New York: Routledge, 1993.
Auty, Richard Resource Abundance and Economic Development (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
Bahar, Atieh. "Oil & Gas." Atieh Bahar Consulting. June 2002. 6 Aug. 2008
<http://www.atiehbahar.com/resources/oil&gas.htm>.
Barnard, Anne. "Russia and Venezuela Will Coordinate on Energy." New York Times. 23 July
2008.3 Oct. 2008 <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/23/world/europe/23russia.html?fta=y>.
Beach, William W., and Tim Kane. Methodology: Measuring the 10 Economic liberalisms.
Heritage Foundation. Heritage Foundation, 2008. 39-55.
<http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/Index2008_Chap4.pdf>.
Beblawi, H., 1990, The Rentier State in the Arab World, in Luciani, G., The Arab State, London,
Routledge
Beblawi, Hazem and Luciani, Giacomo eds., The Rentier State (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
Beehner, Lionel. "What Sanctions Mean for Iran’s Economy." Council on Foreign Relations. 5
May 2006. 12 Sept. 2008 <http://www.cfr.org/publication/10590/>.
102

Behdad, Sohrab. "Khatami and His "Reformist" Economic (Non-)Agenda." Middle East Report
Online. 21 May 2007. 1 June 2008 <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero052101.html>.
Benchmark Assessment Report. United States of America. Office of the President. 17 Sept.
2007. 10 Oct. 2008 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914.html>.
Bronson, Rachel. Thicker Than Oil: America's Uneasy Relationship with Saudi Arabia. New
York: Oxford UP, 2006. 14.
"Brief History." The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 1 Oct. 2008
<http://www.opec.org/aboutus/history/history.htm>.
"Budget body in Iran will be under president." Gulf News. 17 July 2007. 9 Sept. 2008
<http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/07/12/10138593.html>.
Burns, Nicholas. "United States Policy Toward Iran." Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. 29 Mar.
2007. Department of State. 5 Aug. 2008 <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/82374.htm>.
Carpenter, J. Scott. "Reform in the Middle East: A Role for the U.S." Middle East Partnership
Initiative. 7 Mar. 2005. United States Department of State. 12 Oct. 2008
<http://www.abudhabi.mepi.state.gov/reform_in_the_middle_east.html>.
Chaudhry, Kiren. "Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State." Comparative
Politics 27 (1994): 1-25. JSTOR.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. "Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict." Journal of
Conflict Resolution 49 (2005). Academic Search Premier.
"Companies Department." Ministry of the Economy. United Arab Emirates. 6 Oct. 2008
<http://www.economy.ae/english/aboutus/ministrydepartments/pages/companiesdepartment.
aspx
Constitution. The Islamic Republic of Iran. 29 Mar. 1979. 5 Mar. 2008
<http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-4.html>.
Cooper, Peter J. "UAE property law, is there really any reason to worry?" AME INFO. 28 Feb.
2004. 8 Oct. 2008 <http://www.ameinfo.com/35420.html>.
Cordesman, Anthony H. Saudi Arabia Enters the Twenty-First Century. 2003. 14 May 2008
http://books.google.com/books?id=tjpExwQWtOsC&pg=PA344&lpg=PA344&dq=the+first
+plan+%221970+1974%22&source=web&ots=f4_g6CPnAo&sig=5hnGTpIV3k0QfY3NTF
Ehbtsl3dE&hl=en.
"Country Analysis Briefs: Russia." Energy Information Agency. May 2008. Department of
Energy. 3 Oct. 2008 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/russia/background.html>.
103

"Country Analysis Briefs: Venezuela." Energy Information Agency. Oct. 2007. Department of
Energy. 3 Oct. 2008 <http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/venezuela/background.html>.
"Country Energy Profiles." Energy Information Administration. Department of Energy. 20 Sept.
2008 <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm>.
"Culture and Information." UAE News and Information. Ministery of Information and Culture.
10 Oct. 2008 <http://uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2006/english_2006/eyb9.pdf>.
"Discovery of Oil." United Arab Emirates Yearbook 2007. 29 Sept. 2008
<http://uaeinteract.com/uaeint_misc/pdf_2007/english_2007/eyb3.pdf>.
"Dubai strengthens protection of intellectual property rights." UAE Interact. 23 Apr. 2007. The
National Media Council. 8 Oct.
2008<http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/dubai_strengthens_protection_of_intellectual_proper
ty_rights/24953.htm>.
Energy and the Iranian Economy, 109th Cong., 52 (2006) (testimony of Kenneth Katzman).
Friedman, Thomas. "The First Law of Petropolitics." Foreign Policy (2006): 28-36. 16 May
2008.
Ford, Neil. "Iran: A difficult birth the liberalisation of the Iranian economy." Middle East (2002):
48-52.
Ghose, Gaurav. "A liberal economic strategy." Gulf News. 30 Nov. 2006. 5 Oct. 2008
<http://archive.gulfnews.com/indepth/uaenationalday/more_stories/10086232.html>.
Goodman, Peter S. "China Invests Heavily In Sudan's Oil Industry." Washington Post. 23 Dec.
2004.10 Oct. 2008 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/a211432004dec22.html.
"Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]." Global Security. 12 Oct. 2008
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm>.
Gunson, Phil. "Venezuela tightens Iran links with trade pacts." Finanical Times. 18 Sept. 2006.
12 Aug. 2008. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/e48e5dee-473a-11db-83df-0000779e2340.html
Gwertzman, Bernard. "Revolutionary Guards Have Financial Interest in Keeping Iran Isolated."
Council on Foreign Relations. 29 May 2007. 1 June 2008
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/13466/>.
Heard–Bey, Frauke. "The United Arab Emirates: A Quarter Century of Federation." Middle East
Dilemma; The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration. Ed. Michael C. Hudson.
Columbia UP, 1999.
104

Higgins., Andrew. "Iran Studies China Model to Craft Economic Map; Nation Aims to Keep
Political Control And Lift Economy." The Wall Street Journal 18 May 2007: A-4.
Hodler, Roland. "The curse of natural resources in fractionalized countries." European Economic
Review 50 (2006): 1367-386.
Humphreys, Macartan, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Jeffrey D. Sachs. Escaping the Resource Curse.
New York: Columbia UP, 2007.
Hunter, Shireen T. Iran After Khomeini. New York, NY: The Center for Strategic and
International Studies, 1992. 57.
"Home: Property Articles: History of Freehold Property in the Emirates." Ten Real Estate. 8 Oct.
2008 <http://realestate.theemiratesnetwork.com/articles/freehold_property.php>.
Iranian Constitution. Islamic Republic of Iran. http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iraninfo/government/constitution-4.html.
Jensen, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa."
Comparative Political Studies 37 (2004): 816-841. Academic Search Premier.
Jenkins, Linda. "Don't underestimate the importance of oil and gas." 26 Dec. 1997. 24 Sept. 2008
<http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1997/12/29/editorial3.html>.
Kandiyoti, Rafael. "Pipeline politics caused the war in Georgia." United Kingdom Telegraph. 20
Aug. 2008.10 Oct. 2008
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2008/08/20/do2005.xml>.
Kanovsky, Eliyahu. The Economy of Saudi Arabia: Troubled Present, Grim Future. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington DC, 1994. 14 May 2008
http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.com/templateC04.php?CID=14.
Karl, Terry Karl L. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. Berkley, CA: University
of California P, 1997.
"Khalifa revises property ownership Law." UAE Interact. 12 Feb. 2007. The National Media
Council. 8 Oct. 2008
<http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/khalifa_revises_property_ownership_law/23923.htm>.
"Kingdom's Exports for the Years 1997 - 2006." Chart. Central Department of Statistics and
Information. Ministry of Economy and Planning. 20 May 2008
<http://www.cdsi.gov.sa/showproductstandard.aspx?lid=26&pid=2093>.
"The List of Utilities." Supreme Economic Coucil. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 2 Oct. 2008
<http://www.sec.gov.sa/getdoc/47215a65-b78d-4598-8d7a105

2e597e5c1815/list_of_utilities.aspx>.
Luft, Gal. "Iran's Oil Industry: A House of Cards?" Institute for the Analysis of Global Security.
5 July 2007. <http://www.iags.org/n050707.htm>.
Lyne, Jack. "Disney Does the Desert? $5B 'Dubailand' Rising in Middle East." Site Selection. 1
Oct. 2008 <http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/snapshot/sf031117.htm>.
Mahdavi, Hossein. 1970. The Pattern and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States:
the case of Iran. In Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, ed. Michael Cook.
London.
Mahdi, Kamil. "Neoliberalism, Conflict and an Oil Economy: The Case Of Iraq." Arab Studies
Quarterly 29 (2007): 1-20.
Malek, Mohammad. "Oil in Iran between the Two World Wars." Iran Chamber Society. 6 Aug.
2008. 6 Aug. 2008
<http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/oil_iran_between_world_wars.php>.
Maugeri, Leonardo Maugeri. "Oil: Never Cry Wolf—Why the Petroleum Age Is Far from over."
Energy Bulletin. 20 May 2004. 5 June 2008 <http://www.energybulletin.net/node/347>.
McCormack, Sean. "U.S.-Saudi Strategic Dialogue." 18 May 2006. State Department. 17 Sept.
2008 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/66463.htm>.
Meyer, A. J. "Entrepreneurship and Economic Development in the Middle East." The Public
Opinion Quarterly 22 (1958): 391-396.
Middle East Capital Markets Conference, Sheikha Lubna Al Qassimi
"Middle East Free Trade Initiative:U.S. Regional Plan to Spur Economic Growth." United States
Trade Representative. 2003. 13 Oct. 2008
<http://www.ustr.gov/trade_agreements/regional/mefta/section_index.html>.
"Middle East Partnership Initiative." United States Department of State. 13 Oct. 2008
<http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/>.
"Ministry of Economy to keep tight vigil against price rises during Ramadan." Ministry of the
Economy. 19 Sept. 2008. United Arab Emirates. 6 Oct. 2008
<http://www.economy.ae/english/aboutus/newsandevents/pages/ramadanprice.aspx>.
"Ministry fines Americana Dhs10,000 for unauthorized price increase." AME INFO. 30 Dec.
2007. 5 Oct. 2008 <http://www.ameinfo.com/142700.html>.
Mission Statement. The United States of America. Department of State. Department of State and
106

USAID. Department of State. 24 Sept. 2008
<http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2004/23503.htm>.
"Oil and Gas." Government of the United Arab Emirates. 1 Oct. 2008
<http://www.uae.gov.ae/government/oil_gas.htm>.
"Oil, politics and corruption; Bad capitalism carries its own risks." 18 Sept. 2008. 3 Oct. 2008
<http://www.economist.com/research/articlesbysubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=349002&
story_id=12080765>.
OPEC Statue. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Apr. 2006, OPEC.
<http://www.opec.org/library/opec%20statute/pdf/os.pdf>.
Papyrakis , Elissaios and Reyer Gerlagh (2004), The resource curse hypothesis and its
transmission channels, Journal of Comparative Economics 32,181-193.
Phillips, James. "President Bush and the State of the Middle East." Heritage Foundation.
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies. 29 Sept. 2008
<http://www.heritage.org/research/middleeast/upload/wm_1790.pdf>.
"Privatization Strategy; Privatization Objectives and Policies." Supreme Economic Council. 5
Feb. 2001. Government of Saudi Arabia. 15 May 2008
<http://www.sec.gov.sa/english/list.asp?s_contentid=22&s_title=&ContentType=0&CatType
Id=0&Category=3&Step=1>.
Robinson, Colin. "Energy Economist and Economic Liberalism." The Energy Journal 21 (2000).
Ross, Michael "The Political Economy of the Resource Curse," World Politics 51 (January 1999)
Ross, Michael. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" World Politics 53 (2001).
Rosser, Andrew. "Escaping the Resource Curse: The Case of Indonesia." Journal of
Contemporary Asia 37 (2007): 38-58.
Sachs and Warner, 1999 J.D. Sachs and A.M. Warner, The big push, natural resource booms and
growth, Journal of Development Economics 59 (1999), pp. 43–76.
Saudi Arabia. Ministry of Economy and Planning. 7th Development Plan; Strategic Directions of
the Seventh Plan. 22 May 2008 <http://www.mep.gov.sa/>.
Saudi Arabia. Supreme Economic Council. Supreme Economic Council Decisions for Year
2000. 22 May 2008
<http://www.sec.gov.sa/english/list.asp?s_contentid=35&s_title=&ContentType=0&CatType
Id=0&Category=2&Step=1>.
107

Shambayati, Hootan "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State
and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics 26 (April 1994).
Siamdoust, Nahid. "Why Iran Won't Budge on Nukes." 6 Aug. 2008. 7 Aug. 2008
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1829750,00.html?imw=y>.
Siddiqi, Moin A. "Economic Report Iran." Oct. 2001. Academic Source Premier. June 2008.
Smith, Martin. "Frontline: House of Saud." Interview. Washington Post. 9 Feb. 2005. Frontline.
28 Sept. 2008 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/a57224-2005feb2.html>.
Stijns, Jean-Philippe C. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth Revisited."
Department of Economics. Apr. 2005. Northeastern University. 23 Sept. 2008
<www.economics.neu.edu/papers/documents/05-002.pdf>.
Sutherland, Peter. "Transforming Nations." Foreign Affairs 82 (2008): 125-136. Academic
Search Premier. EBSCO. 15 May 2008.
"P5+1 Updated Incentives Package." United States Department of State. 17 June 2008. Office of
the Spokesman. 26 Sept. 2008 <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jun/105992.htm>.
Tavernise, Sabrina. "U.S. Decides to Recognize Russia as Market Economy." New York Times.
7 Jan. 2002.3 Oct. 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9d03e7d9173df934a35755c0a9649c8b63>.
"The A to Z of buying property in Abu Dhabi." AME INFO. 17 Sept. 2008. 8 Oct. 2008
<http://www.ameinfo.com/168394.html>.
The Economy. The United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates. 7 Oct. 2008
<http://www.government.ae/gov/en/biz/business/economy.jsp>.
Trade in UAE. United Aram Emirates. Ministery of the Economy. 12 Oct. 2008
<http://www.uae.gov.ae/government/trade.htm>.
Torvik, Ragnar. "Natural Resources, rent seeking and welfare." Journal of Development
Economics 67 (2002): 455-70.
"UAE: Country outlook." The Economist Intelligence Unit (2007). 01 Feb. 2007. Colombia
International Affairs Online. 6 Oct. 2008.
UAE to add 650,000bpd in two years. Government of the United Arab Emirates. United Arab
Emirates National Media Council. 9 Sept. 2008. 1 Oct. 2008
<http://uaeinteract.com/docs/uae_to_add_650,000bpd_in_two_years_/32187.htm>.
United Arab Emirates: Background. The United States of America. Department of Energy.
108

Energy Information Agency. 1 Oct. 2008
<http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/uae/background.html>.
United States. United States Trade Representative. Trade Summary; Saudi Arabia. 20 May 2008
<http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2008/2008_NTE_Rep
ort/asset_upload_file846_14667.pdf?ht=>.
USTR Issues 2008 Special 301 Report. The United States of America. United States Trade
Representative. 25 Apr. 2008. 5 May 2008
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Press_Releases/2008/April/USTR_Issues_2008_Spe
cial_301_Report.html
Valadkhani, Abbas. "An Analysis of Iran’s Third Five-Year Development Plan in the PostRevolution Era (2000-2005)." 2001. University of Wollongong. 9 Sept. 2008
<http://ro.uow.edu.au/commpapers/399/>.
Vásquez, Ian. "Economic Freedom in the Arab World." Washington Times 22 Dec. 2005. 29
Apr. 2008.
Walters, Timothy N., Alma Kadragic, and Lynne M. Walters. "Miracle or Mirage: Is
Development Sustainable in the United Arab Emirates?" Middle East Review of International
Affairs 10 (2006). Sept. 2006. Colombia International Affairs Online. 1 Oct. 2008.
Wong, Edward. "Iraqis Reach an Accord on Oil Revenues." New York Times. 27 Feb. 2007.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/27/world/middleeast/27iraq.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&h
p.
Wynne, Mark A. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, The Legacy of Milton and Rose Friedman’s
Free to Choose: Economic Liberalism at the Turn of the 21st Century, Oct. 2003, Dallas,
Texas. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Oct. 2003. Federal Reserve Bank. 24 Sept. 2008
<http://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/ftc/intro.pdf>.
Yetiv, Steve A., and Lowell Feld. "America's Oil Market Power: The Unused Weapon Against
Iran." Fall 2007. MIT Press Journal. 25 Sept. 2008
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/wopj.2007.24.3.53?cookieSet=1&journalC
ode=wopj
Zakaria, Fareed. "How to Save the Arab World." Newsweek 24 Dec. 2001.
http://www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/newsweek/122401_how.html.

109

